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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT UNDER SIEGE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF COLORBLIND CONSERVATISM 




Melanie A. Jones 
 
Advisor: Dr. Andrew Polsky 
 
Recent activity by state governments to change voting rights law to limit access to 
the polls by minority voters, and directly challenge the legislation that protects voters 
from discrimination based on race, reveals an unsettling trend: states are increasingly 
comfortable challenging the federal mandate promulgated by the Voting Rights Act 
(VRA) of 1965. The Voting Rights Act was once hailed as a crown jewel in the 
constellation of legislation born of the Civil Rights movement. Its implementation had a 
significant positive impact, expanding the integration of polls and elected offices.  
Reauthorized four times since 1965, the VRA appeared to have become a permanent 
piece of the American voting system. Yet in fact, the VRA has endured significant 
opposition from conservatives since 1965, opposition that has influenced the federal 
government that implements the law. The effort to weaken the protection made possible 
by the VRA is driven by race-based Republican partisanship interested in the 
establishment of a durable conservative majority. Recently, a challenge to Section 5 of 
the VRA, Shelby v. Holder (2013), resulted in a Supreme Court decision that ruled 
Section 4 of the Act is unconstitutional, thereby removing Section 5 coverage over all the 
states required to submit to federal review of their voting law changes. 
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 This dissertation examines how the development of conservatism since 1965 has 
affected the implementation of the Voting Rights Act and the response by the federal 
government and the states to the law and its implementation over time. I argue that the 
development of colorblind conservatism and the ideological platform undergirding it has 
had a chilling and potentially devastating impact on the federal government’s 
implementation of the spirit and letter of the VRA, on stated adherence to the mandates 
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 The Problem. Since 1965, arguments seeking to justify voter discrimination based 
on race have not been politically viable. The advent of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
brought federal government control over state voter discrimination based on race, an 
influx of new voters, and apparent ideological consensus that voter discrimination based 
on race was now patently unacceptable. For nearly fifty years, the federal government, 
authorized by Congress, enforced by presidents, approved by the federal judiciary –– and 
heeded by state legislatures at the polls and during redistricting –– has administered the 
VRA. Much scholarship, even that which opposes the VRA, proceeds on the presumption 
that the VRA, its intention, and the sociological theory that underpins it, have earned a 
permanent place in the fabric of the American voting system.   
Until recently, the idea that the VRA was a permanent part of the American 
political landscape was widely accepted. American geopolitical interests, namely its need 
to end racial discrimination as part of its effort to maintain its power as a global leader, 
helped to motivate the United States to administer the Act effectively. The passage of the 
VRA encountered much opposition, but the end result was a successful law passed by a 
formidable bipartisan coalition, a coalition that sustained itself through the 1990s, 
shepherding the legislation through multiple reauthorizations of its most controversial 
sections. The VRA has had a significant impact on voting rights and legislation since 
1965:  during the fifty years that it has been in force, the federal government, states, and 
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individuals have taken it into consideration when making determinations about voting 
regulations and access.  
Despite the appearance that the VRA voting order is sacrosanct, it has in reality 
experienced much resistance, beginning at its inception and continuing since. The law is 
not and has never been universally accepted at the national level. Initially, the opposition 
consisted of Southern Democrats and states’ rights advocates. But the main driving force 
over time has been conservative Republicans, and the anti-VRA coalition has found a 
secure home in the Republican Party. There, attacks on the VRA have been part of a race-
based strategy to establish a popular majority grounded in hostility to affirmative steps to 
promote equality for racial and language minorities. The GOP-based conservative 
coalition has sharpened its arguments against the VRA into a persuasive ideology, often 
dubbed “colorblind conservatism,” that resonates culturally and politically. This modern 
conservative ideology has established its own legitimacy, providing a strong 
counterweight to the liberal consensus that held sway through the 1990s. The 
argumentation and activities undertaken by conservatives against the VRA have slowly 
developed into effective challenges to the authority of the VRA and to the letter of the 
law. 
 During the long period of apparent VRA hegemony, there has existed a persistent 
and consistent conservative opposition waged specifically at the federal level. This 
resistance is far less obvious than recent resistance by state legislatures, pursued through 
the proposal and passage of voter ID laws and other limitations, all of which will 
arguably limit minority voter access. At the federal level, between 1965 and 2013, 
conservatives against the VRA have played a “long game” to influence the governmental 
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institutions at the national level that implement, enforce, and review the VRA. This “long 
game” opposition is not aimed exclusively at the VRA, instead, it is part of a larger 
Republican agenda to limit Civil Rights legislation and to establish long-term 
conservative majorities. (I use the term “long-game” not to imply a strategy consciously 
crafted to undermine the VRA over time, but rather to capture the persistence of 
conservatives who grasped any opportunity to undercut the law.) Although the far right 
has lost most of its battles against the VRA at the federal level, this conservative coalition 
has exerted some influence over all three of the branches of national government and 
periodically made important gains. Recently, conservatives have made significant 
progress against the VRA as a result of the Supreme Court decisions issued by the 
Roberts Court.   
The development of this conservative influence is important because the federal 
government is responsible for enforcing the VRA. Furthermore, the weakening of the 
VRA order means the resurgence of race-based partisan voter limitations. This 
dissertation will discuss this conservative “long game” in detail as it has influenced 
Congress, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court. Tracking support for the VRA 
by the Federal Government is critical because it reveals cracks in the VRA support 
structure that have had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on the existence of 
a democratic voting system in the United States. Tracking support also makes it clear that 
the VRA does not provide permanent protection for minority voting rights. 
This dissertation argues that the development of a conservative ideology, 
“colorblind conservatism,” has caused friction between the VRA voting order and an 
emergent so-called Colorblind Voting Order. The inertia once generated by the liberal 
4	  
	  
consensus in favor of the VRA has shifted. Today, the new Colorblind Voting Order 
strongly challenges that older consensus to such an extent that it arguably now controls 
voting law and resists changes sought under the VRA at the national level. Analysis of 
primary and secondary literature will support these arguments. This analysis will be 
organized into a synthesis that not only describes, but also rationalizes the changes in the 
responses of the Federal Government to the VRA that have taken place in the last fifty 
years.   
Intercurrence: The Impact of Overlapping Orders on American Political 
Development. The work presented in this dissertation relies significantly on the theory 
posited by American Political Development scholars Karen Orren and Stephen 
Skorownek, who argue that political orders in the United States are subject to 
“intercurrence,” the awkward overlapping of old and new orders which produces friction 
and change.”1  When we apply this approach to voting rights, we see the development of 
those rights as a succession of orders and the tensions between them.  
The VRA enshrined a new order of voting in 1965. The VRA Order contradicted 
the previous order of voting, the “Jim Crow” order (the voting law regime from 1877 to 
1965), and interrupted the operation of traditional federalist relations between the states 
and the national government. The VRA Order is also inconsistent with the voting order 
urged by modern conservatives, who seek to overthrow the VRA Order.   
In fact, the push for a Colorblind Voting Order emerged out of resistance to 
Section 5 of the VRA and from the tension between conservatives and VRA proponents. 
Proponents of the Jim Crow order were driven to resist the institution of the VRA Order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Orren, Karen and Stephen Skorownek. The Search for American Political Development, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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The change in the law struck at the heart of “states’ rights” from the perspective of 
opponents of the VRA. The oppositional effort did not go smoothly at first.  Traditional 
Jim Crow arguments failed in the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s, and so 
conservatives developed new, more persuasive colorblind arguments, which conservative 
forces directed against the legislation from the mid-1980s onward. This dissertation 
investigates the application of those arguments at the national branch level. These 
arguments form the foundation of the tension between the VRA Order and the Colorblind 
Voting Order. 
This dissertation investigates the intercurrence between successive, partly 
overlapping voting orders over time. In the history chapter, I illuminate intercurrence 
between the founding of the nation and Reconstruction; Reconstruction and Jim Crow, 
Jim Crow and the VRA Order, and today, the VRA Order versus the Voting Order. My 
research assumes the existence of significant friction between these orders. My mission is 
to identify change precipitated at the Federal Government level by the friction created by 
the awkward overlapping of the voting orders in the United States.   
 Voting Rights in the United States: Analysis of the Relevant Literature. Scholars 
have written at great length on race and voting rights in the United States. The seminal 
piece of literature is V.O. Key’s analysis of Southern politics.2 Key examined a number 
of states and showed how traditional Democratic Party dominance hindered the 
development of multiparty democracy in those regions, in large part based on the 
disenfranchisement of black voters.3 The idea was that without party competition, blacks 
lacked the leverage they needed to maintain the right to vote in the face of opposition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Key, Valdimer Orlando. Southern Politics and Nation (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1949). 
3 Corbett, John and Valdimer Orlando Key. “Mapping Southern Politics,” Center for Spatially Integrated 
Social Science, accessed April 2015, http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/42. 
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Key wrote his work in 1949, a time when voter discrimination was increasingly under 
attack. Using a heavy emphasis on spatial modeling, Key determined that the monopoly 
held by the Democratic Party in the Southern states “assure [d] locally a subordination of 
the Negro population and, externally…block[ed] threatened interferences from outside 
with these local arrangements.”4 The VRA’s special temporary provisions, Section 5 in 
particular, sought relief from state voter discrimination by targeting state jurisdictions 
charged with the worst voting records, the lowest registration, and lowest participation of 
blacks. The vast majority of these places were in the Southern states Key focused on in 
his study.   
 An alternative argument posits that party competition in the South was possible 
(i.e. there was room for the Republican party to grow in the South and represent blacks in 
their need for voting rights), but that neither major party was willing to forgo the support 
of white Southern voters by taking responsibility for black constituents. According to 
Paul Frymer, post-Reconstruction Republicans pulled out of the South instead of striving 
to expand the Southern wing of the party by aligning itself with blacks. The Republican 
Party was not motivated to work earnestly on behalf of blacks for fear of alienating white 
Southerners, and the Democratic Party thrived by excluding blacks and working against 
their interests. Frymer concludes that party competition was not exercised and that 
therefore both parties ignored the needs of the Negro community, which left anti- 
discrimination legislation unprotected and rendered blacks vulnerable to the onset and 
entrenchment of the Jim Crow voting order.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Key, V.O. Southern Politics, 665. 
5 Frymer, Paul. Uneasy Alliances (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2 and 49–86.   
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There are strong similarities between the legislative gains of the civil rights 
movement and those achieved during Reconstruction. The two eras have a number of 
features in common. Both periods involved “confrontations between North and South, 
between white and black, between federal and state government, [and both 
produced]…the daily evocation of the constitutional amendments, federal laws, 
government polities and court decisions.” 6 Historian C. Vann Woodward coined the 
phrase “Second Reconstruction,” to describe the legislative gains of the civil rights 
movement in his work comparing the First Reconstruction and the legislation achieved in 
the 1960s. Woodward’s work revealed that Jim Crow laws were not an immediate or 
inevitable effect of the end of Reconstruction; instead, the phenomenon developed and 
congealed in the 1890s when states shifted to “legally prescribed, rigidly enforced, state-
wide Jim Crowism.”7  Woodward determined ultimately that the First Reconstruction had 
failed, but he did not advance a solid explanation for exactly why.8  
Based on Woodward’s understanding of the similarities between the two 
reconstructions and the potential for disenfranchisement similar to that which occurred 
after Reconstruction in the 1880s, he warned Congress in 1981 that a weakening of the 
Section 5 preclearance provision of the VRA might “open the door to a rush of measures 
to abridge, diminish and dilute if not emasculate the power of the black vote in Southern 
states…[R]emove that law and the permissiveness will likely become irresistible––in 
spite of promises to the contrary.”9 Woodward’s warning was designed to avoid a counter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Woodward, C. Van. The Future of the Past (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), 199. 
7 Woodward, C. Vann. The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), xii. 
8 Woodward, C. Vann. The Future of the Past (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), 199. 
9 Woodward, C. Vann. “The Danger of Retreating from the Second Reconstruction,” Southern Changes, 
accessed March 2015, http://beck.library.emory.edu/southernchanges/article.php?id=sc04-1_003 
8	  
	  
revolution, perhaps less extreme than that experienced after the First Reconstruction but a 
counter revolution that would potentially make a Third Reconstruction necessary.10 
A number of explanations for the failure of the First Reconstruction have been 
asserted. In his work on the Reconstruction, historian Eric Foner developed a set of 
explanations for the failure of the First Reconstruction: violence, “the weakening of 
Northern resolve,” the inability of Southern Republicans to develop a long-term appeal to 
whites, factionalism, corruption within the GOP, the rejection of land reform, and 
changing patterns in the national and international economic system.11 Alexander 
Keyssar’s seminal work on the history of enfranchisement reveals that the first era is a 
history of exclusion, expansion, and retraction. Keyssar,12 motivated by his work on class 
participation and the history of enfranchisement in the United States, documented the 
expansion of the right to vote in the United States and revealed its cyclical nature. 
Keyssar concluded that democracy in the United States “is less unique than is sometimes 
claimed,”13 and that universal suffrage wasn’t a reality until two hundred years after the 
founding (i.e. in 1965). There has been a “long term trend toward greater inclusion but 
progress has not been smooth or steady and there have been recurrent setbacks.”14 The 
trend illustrated by Keyssar did not end with the passage of the VRA in 1965; exclusion, 
expansion, and contraction of voting rights, persists. More recently, Keyssar has noted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Woodward, C. Vann. “The Danger of Retreating from the Second Reconstruction in Southern Changes.” 
Southern Changes: The Journal of the Southern Regional Council. Vol. 4 No. 1 (1981): 13-15. 
11 Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1988), 603. 
12 Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New 
York, Basic Books, 2000). 
13 Ibid., xxiii. 
14 Keyssar, Alexander, “What Struggles Over the Right To Vote Reveal About American Democracy,” 





the similarity between modern voter ID laws and proposals, and laws proposed and 
passed during the late 1800s in contravention of the 15th Amendment to the US 
Constitution.15  
It may be that institutions and institutional rules were the main forces that shaped 
race relations in the United States during the First Reconstruction. J. Morgan Kousser has 
engaged in comparisons of the First and Second Reconstructions, with a focus on politics 
between approximately 1863 through the turn of the twentieth century. Kousser has 
aimed to assess why the First Reconstruction failed in an effort to shed light on VRA 
problems that are “often taken for granted.”16 Kousser argues that institutions and 
institutional rules were the main force shaping race relations in the United States during 
the First Reconstruction. In his evaluation of the eleven Ex-Confederate States from 
Reconstruction through 1908, he shows how in the South, institutions and rules were 
used to discriminate against minority voters. Kousser notes a striking if underappreciated 
parallel: the disenfranchisement of blacks resulted in the disenfranchisement of a vast 
number of poor whites, as well as limiting the partisan choice in the Southern states.   
Critical to this inquiry, then, is the question of whether the Second Reconstruction 
is in fact an unmitigated success. Richard Valelly compares the two reconstructions to 
determine why the Second Reconstruction, despite its frictions and weak spots, “… is 
still a relative success.”17  His focus is on how the “activities of the federal courts and the 
national party system structure influenced the prospects of coalition and movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Keyssar, A. “Voter Suppression Returns,” Harvard Magazine Forum July-Aug 2012. 
16 Kousser, J. Morgan. “The Voting Rights act and the Two Reconstructions,” Author’s Library Cal Tech, 
accessed March 2015, http://authors.library.caltech.edu/41064/1/Brook.pdf), 2. 
17 Valelly, Richard M. The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 7. 
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politics” 18 during the two reconstructions. Valelly argues that the ability of Democratic 
Party biracial coalitions to expand into “long standing organizations” was far easier 
during the Second Reconstruction than the “creation of eleven new state-level parties 
overnight.”19 That last expedient had been necessary for the Republicans during the First 
Reconstruction, but was attempted unsuccessfully. According to Valelly, the existence of 
viable biracial coalitions in the South in favor of voting reform, combined with positive 
review by the federal judiciary at the start of the new legislation, made possible the 
success of the Second Reconstruction in contrast to the First. 20  
Valelly further argues that the response of the judiciary to voting rights law, 
especially the Court’s initial review, is critical. Valelly states, “If the first decision or set 
of decisions is unfavorable, the Court’s stance thus becomes a new strategic problem for 
a biracial coalition. The number and difficulty of political tasks that it has to perform 
suddenly increases.”21 Valelly argues that the institutionalization of enfranchisement 
through party and jurisprudence building was extremely difficult during the First 
Reconstruction but “relatively easy” and ultimately successful, during the Second.22  He 
avers that the positive initial review of the VRA by the Supreme Court in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach (1966) helped to secure permanently the new voting order established by 
the VRA.   
In this dissertation, I argue that Valelly is largely, but not entirely, correct.  The 
VRA is better established than similar post-Civil War Reconstruction law, and the 
legislation has achieved more. The legislation did take hold and has been administered by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Ibid.,17. 
20 Ibid., 225. 
21 Valelly, The Two Reconstructions,19. 
22 Ibid., 20. 
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the federal government. Presidents have enforced the legislation, the Court has upheld it 
as constitutional (until recently), and Congress has reauthorized the temporary provisions 
of the law four times. States have taken minority voters into account when redistricting 
and at the polls. Voting participation by blacks and other minorities has risen 
significantly as has the number of minority elected officials. Valelly acknowledges that 
the VRA has encountered “friction and weak spots,” but assumes that the political 
environment will maintain VRA hegemony in perpetuity.23 
However, the “friction and weak spots” noted by Valelly are far more serious than 
he suggests. These tensions have developed and congealed into the existence of a strong 
conservative coalition, which over time has resisted the Act and gained control of the 
adjudicating ideology of the Supreme Court. The backlash has developed more slowly 
than was the case during the First Reconstruction, but it is no less detrimental. Since 
1965, conservatives have worked a “long game” to influence the national governmental 
branches that implement the law. While a winning outcome of this offensive was by no 
means guaranteed, it has exercised a consistent influence, grown significantly, and gained 
strength. As a result, the future of the VRA is uncertain and at this moment, the 
legislation arguably wobbles and teeters on the edge of collapse.   
The 2013 Shelby v. Holder decision struck at the heart of the VRA by essentially 
removing the power of the Section 5 preclearance provision. As Woodward warned 
representatives on the floor of Congress in 1981, the removal of the VRA’s preclearance 
power weakens the legislation significantly and could open the door to racially 
discriminatory voting legislation by states. Recent challenges by states against the VRA 
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have arguably been designed to discriminate against voters based on race. The Supreme 
Court decision in Shelby appears to have accelerated that process.24 
Statement of the Argument. Conservative opposition existed prior to the passage 
of the VRA and has existed since, but its partisan center has shifted dramatically. During 
the years between 1965 and today, conservatives have persistently, even systematically, 
resisted the VRA. Conservatives have reframed their original hackneyed and 
unpersuasive arguments, which justified race discrimination, into “colorblind” 
arguments, which seem persuasive, commonplace, and have the patina of fairness. This 
ideological move has been generated by Republican leaders and institutions allied with 
the party, including conservative think tanks. Conservatives have thus managed to shift 
the onus of defending racial distinctions onto their liberal foes. During this period, 
conservative ideologues have influenced Republican presidents in particular on the VRA, 
expressed their opinions and postured in Congress, and slowly but surely gained 
influence over the Supreme Court’s consideration of the VRA. This dissertation seeks to 
answer the questions: Has the conservative movement against the VRA undermined the 
law? How has the development of a conservative movement against the VRA affected the 
implementation of the VRA by the national government? Is the effect of the conservative 
movement at the federal level akin to the activity that caused the end of similar 
legislation during the First Reconstruction? What are the implications of these questions 
for the black electorate? To answer these questions, my research examines the 
conservative influence on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches between 1965 
and 2013.    
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I hypothesize that the GOP-conservative influence on the national government has 
resulted in the placing of limitations on the legislation, culminating in a decrease in VRA 
implementation and enforcement. These actions have made the VRA less effective at 
controlling state efforts to discriminate against voters based on race.  
 Chapter Preview. This dissertation consists of six chapters, including the 
Introduction and a Conclusion. The second chapter is a history of voting rights in the 
United States between 1850 and 1970.25 The third, fourth, and fifth chapters look at the 
development of the influence of conservatism on the federal government and the VRA in, 
respectively, Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary between 1970 and 2013. 
The history chapter relies on secondary literature dealing with conservative 
resistance and full enfranchisement, states’ rights, Reconstruction, and the Jim Crow 
period. The historical section will establish the ongoing existence of two political orders 
with a stake in voting rights, a VRA Order, committed to increasing minority voter access 
and representation, and a partisan-based, conservative resistance now dedicated to 
colorblind conservatism. The chapter is designed to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the difference between the Jim Crow voting order and the VRA Order, 
to provide a basis for the motivation of the proponents of the two orders, to show the 
impact each order has on the relationship between the states and the national government, 
and to provide a demonstration of the intercurrence principle, discussed above. 
The remainder of the dissertation is designed to examine closely the rhetoric, 
actions, and impact of conservatism on each of the national branches in their treatment of 
the VRA between 1970 and 2013. In the successive chapters covering Congress, the 
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executive branch, and the judiciary, I will consider the rhetoric and actions of each 
branch to assess how conservative resistance to the VRA translated into or failed to 
translate into authoritative measures that negatively impacted the enforcement of the 
VRA. I will demonstrate that due to the influence of conservatism, support for the VRA 
has waned over time in all three branches. I will argue that in fact, the development of the 
response by each national branch to the VRA has not been linear or continuous, but has 
followed a more nuanced and circuitous route influenced by unique powers and 
limitations of the branches of government and the social and political contexts of each 
administration. 
 The executive branch chapter will consider whether executive support for the 
VRA has declined steadily since 1970, regardless of the party affiliation of the executive.  
My analysis will confirm that Republican presidents have been more resistant to the VRA 
than the Democratic presidents during the relevant time frame. Nevertheless, because 
partisan conservative resistance to the VRA has grown more acceptable over time, even 
Democratic presidents, including Barack Obama, the nation’s first black President, have 
signaled less enthusiasm for, or enforced the Act to a lesser degree, than did President 
Lyndon Johnson. It is also the case that Republican presidents serving during time 
periods dominated by a liberal consensus in support of the VRA were more supportive of 
the law than some of the Democrats. I rely on Department of Justice (DOJ) statistics 
showing enforcement rates for the VRA, statements by Attorneys General before 
Congress, news reports, and secondary material in the form of biographies, law review 
articles, and journal articles. The chapter addresses executive directives to the DOJ, 
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renewal activity, and civil rights policy and statements, as well as relevant appointment 
activity and DOJ statistics. 
Congress has renewed and expanded the VRA each time it has come up for 
reauthorization, but I seek to show that the legislative success of the VRA by roll call 
vote masks significant resistance. Specifically, I argue that the partisan Republican 
campaign against the VRA has adopted different ideological themes during 
reauthorization debates, and that the newer themes and arguments have gained traction in 
the form of increasingly robust dissent. To establish a path of ideological themes, I 
review roll call votes and testimony from the Congressional reauthorization hearings in 
1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, and use journal and law review articles about Congress and 
the VRA. The purpose will aim to identify arguments waged against the VRA by its 
opponents and to illuminate action taken by these opponents to decrease the effectiveness 
of the VRA or to overturn its temporary provisions. My work will demonstrate that 
debate has become more contentious at each reauthorization session due to the passage of 
time and resultant fading of the memories of Jim Crow, the improvements in voter access 
and minority electoral success, and the increased salience of colorblind conservative 
argumentation.  
Judicial support of federal legislation is one of the main criteria for the success of 
voting rights legislation, according to Valelly. I seek to document the declining support 
for the VRA-defined voting rights order by the judiciary since 1970. I will consider 
relevant Supreme Court cases that span the time period. I propose to demonstrate that 
changes in the Court’s membership by Republican appointments have increased judicial 
support for colorblind conservatism and opposition to the VRA. My work will trace the 
16	  
	  
incremental shift from complete assent in 1966,26 to significant doubt,27 to outright 
dissent on the constitutionality of the VRA’s temporary provisions by 2013.28   
These substantive chapters on the national government will be followed by a 
conclusion. The conclusion will summarize my findings and offer suggestions for further 
research. 
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History of Voting and Race in the United States 1776-1965: 
Expansion and Contraction 
 
In this chapter, I will illustrate the state of race-based voting law and practice in 
the United States prior to the adoption of the Voting Rights Act. The VRA ushered in a 
period in the United States where black Americans could vote, unmolested by state 
government intervention. This was a significant change from the period preceding the 
Voting Rights Act, during which states systematically restricted blacks from voting based 
on race. The Act establishes a bright line between the large-scale enfranchisement of 
blacks and the denial of that right. Because of that bright line, I will refer to race-based 
voting laws and practice before the VRA as occurring during the “Pre-Modern Period” 
and assert that the VRA introduced the “Modern Period.” In this chapter, I divide the Pre-
Modern period into intercurrent voting orders, describe the development of voting laws 
and practice and provide context for the later discussion of the influence of conservatism 
on the national branches in their enforcement of the VRA. 
 The Pre-Modern Voting Regime, encompassing the years 1776-1965, is 
characterized by the denial of black enfranchisement by state governments29 and minimal 
interference by the federal government.  However, within the Pre-Modern Voting 
Regime, there was an expansion and contraction of black voting rights. Orders represent 
periods of stasis during which regulation of black enfranchisement has definable 
characteristics that differ from prior and subsequent periods. The Pre-Modern Voting 
Regime can be divided into three orders, viz. The Establishment Voting Order (EVO) 
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lasting from the country’s founding through the end of the Civil War; the Reconstruction 
Voting Order (RVO), including the period of Radical Reconstruction; and the Jim Crow 
Voting Order (JCO), which runs from the late 1800s until 1965.  
 The EVO, 1776-1863, is characterized by state control of the franchise and the 
denial of the right to vote based on class and race. During this period, there was an initial 
expansion of black voting rights and a subsequent contraction of those rights as the 
country progressed. In the late 1700s, the federal government worked toward ending 
slavery and providing the right to vote to blacks. For example, in 1780, Congress banned 
slavery in the federal territories. In 1794 slave exportation was banned, as was 
importation in 1808. “In fact, more progress was made to end slavery and achieve civil 
rights for blacks in America than was made by any other nation in the world.”30  Most but 
not all states denied the franchise to blacks. States that did allow blacks to vote 
overturned their laws as the century progressed and as slavery compromises between the 
Northern and Southern states collapsed. In 1820 the Missouri Compromise sanctioned 
slavery in the territories; in 1850, a Fugitive Slave Act was passed. In 1854, the Kansas 
Nebraska Act opened the possibility of slavery in the Western states. States reversed their 
voting laws and prohibited blacks from voting. For example, Maryland ended the black 
franchise in 1809 and North Carolina in 1835.31   
 Legal recognition of slavery and the expansion of the institution were important to 
the contraction of black voting rights.  The black slave labor system yielded major 
economic benefits to slave and non-slave states alike and required the subordination of 
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blacks. Slave states denied the right to vote as part of a package of repression to maintain 
the chattel system. Free states denied the right to vote as part of the social hierarchy, 
which discouraged black citizenship as part of often myriad efforts to dissuade blacks 
from taking up residence in their states. The denial of the franchise was codified in state 
constitutions, supported by the U. S. Constitution, and well accepted as part of the social 
order in both Southern and Northern states.   
 The Constitution does not provide an affirmative right to vote. Under Article I, 
the Constitution leaves the administration of the franchise to the states. Section 4 
provides that the federal government may take control over federal elections in the event 
that Congress is dissatisfied with state regulation, but in general, the administration of 
elections is not an express or implied right of Congress. Furthermore, states were 
empowered to conduct elections under the 10th Amendment police powers, which 
reserved rights for states to control law enforcement, marriage, education, and voting.   
During the EVO, the federal government did not interfere with state denial of the 
franchise to blacks. The second-class status of blacks was implied by the Constitution, 
and it provided neither recourse for blacks denied the right to vote nor power for the 
federal government to provide relief for such a denial. At no point was the federal 
government persuaded to intercede in state laws, based on arguments made by founding 
fathers, or white and black abolitionists, who attempted to persuade the federal 
government to intervene.  
 White supremacy developed during the 1800s in conjunction with the expansion 
of slavery and the subordination of blacks. White supremacist ideology included anti-
black franchise arguments. Common parlance dictated that blacks were not citizens and 
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that they were less human than whites. These arguments were supported by eugenic 
evidence. Blacks were deemed incapable of being responsible or knowledgeable voters.  
White supremacist arguments provided a cultural base from which to launch social 
reprisals against blacks who attempted to register or vote and against those who took the 
vocal position that blacks should be able to vote. The arguments also provided a 
foundation for the legal denial of the franchise by state governments. 
 By the 1850s, slave and free state compromise had all but collapsed. The 1857 
Dred Scott decision that Congress could not control slavery in the territories alarmed 
northern states, who were particularly concerned about the response of the Buchanan 
administration to the decision. Southern states maintained ongoing concern about the 
viability of slavery in the United States, and grew extremely concerned when the anti-
slavery Republican Party elected a president and earned a majority in Congress. South 
Carolina hardliners provoked that state to secede from the Union after the election. Nine 
states followed. The Civil War ensued. The ongoing free state/slave state conflict led the 
nation to war and eventually to federal intervention into the institution of slavery. Federal 
intervention resulted in black citizenship and subsequently opened the franchise to 
blacks. 
 The outcome of the Civil War changed the relationship of the federal government 
to black civil rights and to the black franchise. Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery in 
Washington D.C. and issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Although the proclamation 
did not have the force of law in the Confederacy, it precipitated the end of the slave 
system nonetheless. To end slavery officially and permanently, Lincoln proposed and 
supported the passage of the 13th Amendment. By emancipating blacks, Lincoln ended 
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the “social death” caused by designation as a slave. Citizenship followed relatively 
quickly, emerging as a result of the 14th Amendment and a series of Civil Rights Acts.   
 The 14th Amendment stipulated that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”32  
This is the first appearance of language in the Constitution that specifically obligates 
states to respect the citizenship of blacks inside their borders. The 13th and 14th 
Amendments provided a foundation for the establishment of the black franchise. 
 Black voting quickly became a contested post-war issue.  The presidents (Lincoln 
and Andrew Johnson) and Congress divided over black enfranchisement and whether it 
should be required of the Southern states to earn readmission to the Union. The 
relationship of the political parties in Congress was changed as a result of emancipation, 
and Southern Democrats gained seats as a result of the expansion of their electorate. The 
Republican Party was eager to gain a foothold in the South to neutralize the 
homogeneous power of Southern Democrats and to prevent the Southern gentry from 
regaining power it held prior to the war. As a result, Radical Republicans in Congress 
pushed hard to require that the South grant the franchise to blacks before readmission.   
 Presidents Lincoln and Johnson disagreed. The presidents prioritized restoring the 
Union. Reconstruction plans offered by the presidents did not include a requirement that 
states enfranchise black voters. Lincoln pledged to recognize any state government where 
10% of the number of individuals who voted in the 1860 presidential election took an 
amnesty oath. President Johnson continued the Lincoln approach. He pardoned many 
Southern landowners who retook control of state governments, confiscated land 
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dispensed to blacks by the Freedman’s Bureau, and refused Congressional urging to 
require that states adhere to the 14th Amendment dictates on voting. The Amendment did 
not provide an affirmative right to vote but did order a reduction in the size of the voting 
delegation of any state that “denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State…reduced 
in proportion [to the number of men excluded by the state to the whole number of 
citizens].”33 Radical Republicans vied with Lincoln and Johnson over the proper contours 
of Reconstruction. 
 Radical Republicans gained control of Congress in 1866 and instituted their 
Radical Reconstruction program in 1867. Congress replaced civilian governments with 
U.S. Army occupation authority. The army governments conducted elections. Blacks 
voted in the elections while former Confederates were excluded from the ballot box and 
prevented from running for office. Integrated legislatures acted to provide the franchise to 
blacks, to protect those rights by revising state constitutions, and to pass legislation to 
prohibit segregation, to establish public education, and to open public transportation, state 
police, and other institutions to blacks.34  Blacks were elected to local and state 
legislatures, state and local offices, and to Congress.  
 During Radical Reconstruction, Southern Democrats resisted black inclusion and 
the black franchise vociferously. Southern Democrats wielded intimidation, violence, 
black codes, and economic reprisals to prevent blacks from political participation.  
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Democratic veterans established the Ku Klux Klan to overthrow Republican dictates and 
pave the way for Democrats to regain control.35   
The worst instance of racial violence on record during Reconstruction was waged 
over objection to black electoral participation. During the 1866 Colfax Massacre, 
Southern Democrats slaughtered blacks and black sympathizers at the state Republican 
Convention in Colfax, Louisiana, killing forty blacks, twenty whites, and wounding one 
hundred fifty people.36 In the wake of this attack, the Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Cruikshank (1870) that the Enforcement Acts of 1870, designed to punish 
vigilante violence like that meted out at Colfax, did not apply because the alleged 
offenders were not state representatives nor were they acting under color of state law.  
 In response to the massacre, Radical Republicans continued to work to protect 
black voting rights. Spurred by the intense and ongoing resistance of Southern 
Democrats, and concerned about how narrowly Ulysses S. Grant was elected to the 
presidency in 1868, Radicals proposed and passed the 15th Amendment. Although blacks 
are not mentioned specifically in it, the Radicals intended that the amendment serve to 
protect the franchise of voters regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”37 Southern Democrats continued to resist. The passage of time and the 
resistance of Southern Democrats eroded Republican support for Radical Reconstruction. 
Northern Republican support also waned, setting the stage for party compromise in 1876. 
 When presidential candidates Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel J. Tilden tied for 
the post, the parties agreed that in exchange for the removal of military authority in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Smalley, Eugene V. A Brief History of the Republican Party: From its Organization to the Presidential 
Campaign of 1884 (New York: John Alden Publishing, 1884), 49-50. 
36 “The Riot in New Orleans,” Harper’s Weekly, Aug. 25, 1866. 
37 US Const. amend. XV. 
24	  
	  
states where it remained (Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida), Republican Hayes 
would be granted the presidency. The agreement ended Radical Reconstruction and 
returned Southern Democrats en masse to Congress. The number of enfranchised blacks, 
particularly in the South, declined precipitously. Blacks were purged from the voter rolls, 
refused and removed from office, and excluded from polls in local, state, and federal 
elections. The compromise ended federal intervention into black electoral participation in 
the South. 
 The end of Radical Reconstruction legislation and enforcement of the 
Reconstruction amendments were facilitated by the Supreme Court. Post-Reconstruction 
decisions weakened future efforts to enforce the right to vote.38 In the Slaughter House 
Cases (1873) the Court interpreted the 14th Amendment “privileges and immunities” 
clause as extending only to the federal government. The Court held in practice that the 
14th Amendment did not restrict state enforcement of their police powers. The Court 
noted that the 14th Amendment was designed for the protection of former slaves, yet the 
limitations imposed on the amendment by the Court allowed discrimination against 
former slaves.39 U.S. v. Reese (1878), the Court’s first voting rights case under the 
Enforcement Acts of 1870, held that the 15th Amendment did not provide the right to 
vote; instead it prevented discrimination against those who were granted the right to vote 
by the state. The Reese decision also held that the section of the Enforcement Acts at 
issue was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of the 15th Amendment. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Frymer, Uneasy Alliances, 63. 
39 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
25	  
	  
cases provided a legal foundation for state to deny the right to vote in contravention of 
the Reconstruction Amendments.40 
 The Court continued to publish decisions that interfered with efforts by blacks to 
maintain citizenship and access to the franchise. The Civil Rights Cases (1883) struck the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which entitled individuals to the use of public facilities. The 
Court held that the legislation was beyond Congressional authority under the 14th 
Amendment, which applied to the states and not to private individuals.41  But, in Ex Parte 
Yarbourgh (1884), the Court ruled that Congress did have the authority to pass the 
Enforcement Acts of 1870 and individuals did not have standing to interfere with voting 
in federal elections.42  Nonetheless, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1866), the Court legitimized 
the “separate but equal” doctrine, which provided a legal foundation for the burgeoning 
Jim Crow regime. The Court ruled that as long as accommodations were equal, they 
could be separate.43 Ironically, the dissent in Plessy established the basis for colorblind 
constitutionalism, at issue in this dissertation.44 In Williams v. Mississippi (1898), the 
Court held that the states’ administration of poll taxes and literacy tests were not 
discriminatory, because they were requirements imposed on all voters.45 
 The 1876 election of President Hayes began a “let alone” policy in the South.46  
Federal troops were removed and Hayes extolled the virtues of states’ rights in spite of a 
high rate of white-on-black violence in the Southern states. Hayes was urged to seek the 
support of Southern Whigs, which he did in part to move the Republican Party away from 
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its affiliation with blacks. Enfranchised blacks remained Republican and disenfranchised 
blacks could be recruited to the party easily if solicited. Hayes did seek federal funding to 
enforce the right to vote for blacks but did not push the issue when support was denied.  
Paul Frymer argues that if Hayes had been able to secure funding, Republicans may well 
have been able to muster a Southern presence and Republican majorities in Congress in 
1878. Hayes opted not to court black voters and instead focused on gaining the support of 
“disgruntled Southern white Democrats.”47   
 As indicated above, Plessy v. Ferguson heralded the beginning of the Jim Crow 
Voting Order (JVO). The JVO persisted for over seven decades, from 1880 to 1965. The 
vast majority of blacks were barred from voting, and civil rights movements were largely 
unsuccessful. Denial of the right to vote took on a heightened importance in local social 
structures and in the relationship between states and the federal government. States 
desired, in particular, to exercise the right to set voter qualifications and to discriminate at 
the polls. The national government acquiesced to state control of the franchise and its 
limitations on black voters. Jim Crow regulations also applied in Washington D.C., the 
seat of the federal government.   
 The failure of the federal government to interfere with state voting regulations 
was in large part due to the inability of civil rights activists to pass legislation in 
Congress. Southern Democrats maintained significant power in Congress during the Jim 
Crow period. Once they returned to Congress after Reconstruction, Southern Democrats 
continued their domination of the South, held seats that were uncontested in state 
elections, and gained seniority. Seniority allowed Southern Democrats to attain control of 
committees important to preventing federal intervention in the JVO. Southern Democrats 
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blocked the passage of federal legislation that would provide benefits and protections to 
blacks. Democrats systematically denied passage of civil rights bills including anti-
lynching provisions, integration efforts, and grants of public benefits. The legislative 
bottleneck made civil rights gains impossible. Because of this state of affairs, the 
NAACP was motivated to shift their focus away from its legislative program to one that 
focused on the courts. 
 Presidents after Hayes eschewed taking action to establish the franchise for black 
Americans until Harry Truman’s effort in the 1940s. While presidents took some action 
on civil rights, action, which in some cases contributed to the effort toward the black 
franchise, no president after 1876 and before the 1940s made legislative efforts to secure 
the franchise for blacks. Presidents named blacks to federal posts, and sought the counsel 
of individual blacks like Booker T. Washington, but did little to provide benefits and 
protections on a grand scale. Those benefits that were established by presidents, like the 
New Deal, were strategically written to exclude blacks. 
 Truman prized civil rights and began during his presidency to push for civil rights 
reform. In 1946 Truman established a President’s Committee on Civil Rights. On 
February 2, 1948 Truman delivered a “[d]aring civil rights speech to a joint session of 
Congress where he urged a civil rights package that included protection against lynching, 
better protection of the right to vote, and a permanent Fair Employment Practices 
Commission.”48 But little civil rights legislation actually resulted from Truman’s call to 
action. The Congress, led by Southern Democrats, successfully opposed Truman’s 
recommendations. Truman did use his executive power to end discrimination in federal 
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employment and to end segregation in the U.S. military.49 Indeed, the U.S. military 
played perhaps an unintended role in black efforts toward empowerment. Black 
participation in WWII had helped to fuel the civil rights movement, since black American 
veterans, having generally distinguished themselves in war as well as having encountered 
European societies less overtly hostile to blacks than in America, resented the poor 
treatment they encountered on their return to the United States. Blacks began to 
demonstrate against and to resist Jim Crow laws more actively.   
 The civil rights movement picked up steam in the 1950s. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
led the Montgomery Bus Boycotts in 1956. The civil unrest that resulted from civil rights 
action repeatedly became issues that demanded presidents’ attention. Civil rights unrest 
prompted several executives to take action that further fueled the civil rights effort, and 
secured the civil rights movement’s place on the national and international stage. 
President Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to assist black 
students enrolling at Little Rock High School. Subsequently, the president felt compelled 
to address the issue of black voting rights. He signed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to 
provide voting rights protections, the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction.   
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 established both a Civil Rights Commission to 
investigate voting irregularities and a Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department. 
The bill empowered the Attorney General and individuals to initiate litigation to provide 
relief for voting violations and trial by jury for registration obstruction. The power of the 
legislation was weak, limited by the influence of Southern Democrats in Congress. 
Ultimately, Eisenhower’s actions produced little change in voting in the Jim Crow Voting 
Order. 
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 Eisenhower tried again in 1960. Seeking to fill holes in the Civil Rights Act of 
1957, the president proposed a bill that assigned stronger penalties for registration and 
voter obstruction as well as establishing a civil rights commission. Again, the legislation 
did nothing to impact the status quo. Southern state governments continued to exclude 
black voters from registration and maintained segregation of schools and public facilities.  
Eisenhower urged Congress that “every individual regardless of his race, religion, or 
national origin is entitled to equal protection of the laws.”50 Cumulatively the civil rights 
acts passed under Eisenhower did improve black voter registration by 3%,51 though 
neither bill made a significant impact on voter registration or ballot casting by southern 
blacks. Nevertheless, the legislative effort was important precisely because it established 
the White House as a civil rights advocate, helped to develop bipartisan support for black 
voting rights, and strengthened the platform for civil rights legislation to follow. 
 President Kennedy was also not motivated to take federal action until forced by 
incidents of civil rights unrest that he felt he could no longer ignore. Kennedy refused to 
send federal help to civil rights activists in a number of instances, but he was inclined to 
respond after a couple of high-impact events occurred. In September 1962, the president 
sent US Marshals to accompany James Meredith to register at the University of 
Mississippi by Supreme Court order. In April 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. was jailed 
while demonstrating in Birmingham, Alabama. In May 1963, Bull Connor ordered 
Birmingham police to use dogs and water hoses against demonstrators. These events 
brought national attention to segregation in the South. On the same day that Bull Connor 
refused to admit black students to the University of Alabama, June 11, 1963, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





president sent the National Guard to Tuscaloosa and proposed a major civil rights bill to 
Congress.52 The bill included voting protections for blacks. Kennedy’s assassination in 
November 1963 made passage of the legislation during his term impossible. 
 President Johnson used the national grief from Kennedy’s assassination to fuel 
momentum toward furthering the legislative effort for a comprehensive civil rights bill in 
1964. Johnson was able to garner bipartisan support and push the bill through Congress. 
The 1964 act “outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”53 Title I of the Act forbade discrimination in registration and voting, and 
outlawed literacy tests. The Act established a Commission on Equal Employment 
Opportunity to enforce equity in federal employment.54 However, the Act did not provide 
a remedial alternative to that provided by the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. 
Litigation remained the sole method to seek remedial action in voter discrimination cases 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accurately described as “the most sweeping civil 
rights bill passed in a century,” the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ironically did not include 
provisions to prevent states from imposing discrimination at the polls and it did not 
significantly improve black voter registration or participation. 
 The civil rights community continued to push forward on the right to vote. Civil 
rights leaders pressured President Johnson for a comprehensive voting rights bill. 
Johnson refused. He deemed the request for a voting rights act, so close on the heels of 
the sweeping Civil Rights Act, unrealistic and unreasonable and asked the black 
community to be patient. Nonetheless, the president proposed a bill after the violence 
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undertaken by state actors against civil rights demonstrators on a march from 
Montgomery to Selma, Alabama in 1964. Following an international response to the 
event, whose horrors were televised around the world, the president gave a speech in 
support of a voting rights bill to Congress and submitted a proposal.  
 After the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had become a more 
reliable source of civil rights protection than the legislative or executive branches. The 
process was gradual and not absolute, but many of the Court’s voting rights decisions did 
benefit petitioners seeking inclusion. The Court also encountered a subject matter shift 
during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration. The opinion of the Court gradually 
changed from non-interventionist and pro-states’ rights to one more concerned with the 
enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the preservation of human and civil rights. In 
voting rights cases, the Court increasingly made federal intervention more the rule than 
the exception.55   
However, the Supreme Court’s voting rights decisions did not have an immediate 
democratizing impact on the franchise. Most of the Court’s decisions did not prevent 
voter discrimination. States and political parties would just pick an alternative method to 
discriminate against voters. In Guinn v. United States (1915), the Court ruled that the 
grandfather clauses in the Maryland and Oklahoma constitutions violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment.56 The decision voided provisions in the constitutions of Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia. In response, the Oklahoma state legislature 
replaced the grandfather clause with a new statute that allowed discrimination. The 
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second statute was subsequently struck down, but not until 1939, in Lane v. Wilson.57 
 In 1927, the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Dr. L.A. Nixon, when he 
challenged a Texas state law that prevented him from voting in a Texas primary under the 
14th and 15th Amendments.58 In response to the decision, the Texas legislature adapted a 
new rule to an existing one that allowed political parties to “in [their] own way determine 
who shall be qualified to vote.”59 Nixon was once again denied the right to vote under the 
new rule based on his race, and he sued again. The Court struck down this new rule 5-4 to 
say that the Democratic executive committee was acting under a grant of state power.  
State officials, were not allowed to delegate official functions in such a way as to 
discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black.60 The Court did not deal with 
Nixon’s claims under the 15th Amendment.  
Because the Democratic Party dominated the political systems of all the Southern 
states after Reconstruction, its state and local primary elections usually determined which 
candidate would ultimately win office in the general election. Thus, any voters excluded 
from the Democratic primary were effectively excluded from exercising any meaningful 
electoral choice. The Court did not provide protection for private action, however. After 
the Nixon v. Condon decision, the Texas Democratic Party adopted a rule banning blacks 
from primary elections. A Texas resident, R.R. Grovey, sued under the 14th and 15th 
Amendments. The Court held unanimously that the party rule was constitutional, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
58 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
59 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932). 
60 Ibid., at 73. 
33	  
	  
party was a private organization, which unlike the state, could discriminate against black 
voters.61 
The Court eventually changed its position in Grovey, eleven years later in Smith v. 
Allwright (1944), another Texas primary case. In Smith, the Court overturned the Texas 
state law that allowed the Democratic Party to set internal rules. The Court held that by 
delegating its authority to the state party, the state allowed discrimination. Justice Reed 
explained, that a state cannot “permit a private organization to practice racial 
discrimination [in elections].”62 By 1944, the Court had shifted from issuing decisions 
that established a legal foundation for Jim Crow to regularly issuing decisions that upheld 
racial equality under the 14th and 15th Amendments, both in public and in private 
organizations exercising state functions.  
In 1954, the Court unanimously ruled that segregation in public education 
violated the 14th Amendment.63 The Brown v. Board of Education decision did little to 
motivate integration, but it did establish a moral imperative that contributed to changing 
attitudes about segregation. The decision also reflected the strong degree to which the 
Court had become committed to individual rights. The Court applied the 15th Amendment 
similarly. In 1960 in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court held that an Alabama electoral 
district, drawn with the purpose to disenfranchise black voters, violated the 15th 
Amendment. The Alabama legislature drew a twenty-eight-sided district, excluding all 
but a few potential black votes. According to the Court, Alabama’s representatives were 
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unable to identify “any countervailing municipal function,” which the redistricting was 
designed to serve and concluded that the sole reason for the district lines was race.64   
 The Court also became more interested in equality in the electorate in general. In 
Baker v. Carr (1962), the Court ruled that redistricting was not a political question and 
that the Court could evaluate it. As such, the Court ruled on the Tennessee redistricting 
law that arguably ignored significant growth and population shifts in the district. Two 
years later, in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), an Alabama lawsuit based on the principle of 
“one person, one vote,” the Court held that state legislature districts need to be roughly 
equal in population. The decision affected many state legislatures that up to that point had 
not redistricted to take account of population growth disparities in districts.65 These cases 
are an aside to the race voting cases, but they do reflect the development of the Court’s 
jurisprudence that increasingly put value on equal access to the franchise. In short, the 
Court was prepared by the time the VRA was passed to support its unique method of 
federal intervention and purpose to expand and democratize the electorate. The Court 
initially supported the Act, much to the benefit of the VRA Order. 
 All three of the Pre-Modern voting orders described above were characterized by 
both the exclusion of the black voter from the franchise and by minimal interference by 
the federal government. Blacks were granted the right to vote after the Civil War, but the 
period during which blacks exercised the franchise was characterized by strong resistance 
from Southern Democrats, who restricted Southern blacks from voting after 
Reconstruction, and for a long period after power was effectively returned to the 
Southern gentry. The Southern effort was assisted greatly by these Southern Democrats 
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who wielded significant power in Congress and wielded the power to block all civil rights 
measures that would provide federal intervention. The development of the civil rights 
movement and the agreement of the executive branch to encourage legislative changes to 




Chapter 3  
Congress: The Conservative “Long Game” and the VRA 
 
Congress passed the VRA in 1965 and has reauthorized it, including its 
controversial temporary provisions, four times. Each of the final roll call votes approving 
the legislation in the House and the Senate garnered strong majorities.66 However, roll 
call votes on the VRA or its renewal mask significant and consistent dissent in Congress.  
Each time the VRA has been considered, dissent has been expressed in one or more ways 
including: (1) argumentation against the Act; (2) the exercise of delay tactics to prevent 
consideration of a reauthorization bill; (3) the use of delay tactics to slow or stop 
deliberation over reauthorization; (4) the maintenance of a space for dissent against the 
Act, even during the height of the liberal consensus.   
 These elements have been present at each reauthorization of the VRA. The 
dissent, both tactical and argumentative, over the life of the Act establishes that the VRA 
has always commanded less than the full support of Congress. Strong legislative dissent, 
even though it has failed to prevent reauthorization, has been steady and contributed to 
the development of increasingly effective opposition to VRA enforcement. This matters 
because to remain operational and effective at protecting minority voters, the VRA needs 
the willing support of all three branches of national government. The consistent 
conservative dissent against the VRA has established Congress as a space in which 
dissent against the Act can be expressed and developed, and this dissent has had a 
negative impact on the VRA.   
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The 1970 Reauthorization: Get the Monkey Off Our Backs. The Voting Rights 
Act experienced well-publicized success in its first five years. Registration of “nearly one 
million voters was recorded,”67 accompanied by a strong increase in the number of blacks 
elected to office.68 Because the VRA appeared to work, conservatives in Congress 
anticipated the possibility of securing the repeal of Section 5 as early as 1970, when the 
temporary provisions first came up for reauthorization. Harry Dent (SC), the then 
Republican Party Chairman and a key Congressional proponent of Nixon’s Southern 
Strategy, remarked at a meeting of the Southern GOP state chairmen that “the Voting 
Rights Act looks like it’s coming along pretty good so that the monkey will be off the 
backs of the South.”69 Dent’s comment revealed that conservatives in 1970 were anxious 
to escape VRA coverage even though the legislation had not been fully enforced and had 
not achieved all of its aims.  
Ironically, the apparent success of and publicity surrounding the Act masked 
much evidence of its actual failure. Proponents of reauthorization cited the unpublicized 
record of unsuccessful aspects of the VRA program as support for the argument that the 
temporary provisions of the VRA ought to be renewed. In 1970, neither black voter 
registration nor turnout had reached parity with the corresponding situations for white 
voters. Civil Rights Commission member Frankie Freeman explained, “[A]lthough black 
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voter registration is much higher now than it was before the passage of the Voting Rights 
Act, it still lags well behind white registration in all of the States covered by the act.”70   
Reauthorization proponents produced a bevy of witnesses in Congress to highlight 
what positive developments there were, to help make the case for reauthorization of the 
temporary provisions of the VRA. Also, proponents asserted that reauthorization was 
necessary because the work the Act was intended to do was not complete, and in fact it 
was hindered by various ongoing state actions.  
During the 1970 reauthorization hearings, the Nixon administration led the 
conservative backlash against reauthorization of the temporary provisions in the House of 
Representatives. Attorney General John Mitchell pitched an alternative to the simple five-
year renewal bill sponsored by Emmanuel Cellar (NY-D), and pushed the alternative bill 
from the House Judiciary Committee to the floor. The Mitchell bill appealed to 
conservatives. It called for a limited three-year extension of the Act, removal of the 
Section 5 preclearance provision, and an end to the use of the 1964 presidential election 
as the Section 5 trigger for coverage.71 Republicans in general and Southerners in 
particular supported the Mitchell bill and worked to secure it as the House bill. 
Conservatives used delay tactics to help protect the bill. William Colmer (MS-D), a 
conservative and Chairman of the House Rules Committee, dubbed the Cellar Bill the 
“civil wrongs bill” and held it up for four months in the Rules Committee, releasing it 
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only under the condition that it would be amended to “reflect the proposals embodied in 
the Mitchell bill.”72 House representatives voted 208-203 to substitute the Mitchell 
proposal for the Cellar bill and subsequently voted in favor of the Mitchell bill in a final 
roll call vote.73 The winning votes came from Southern Democrats—representatives from 
all of the covered states voted in favor— in conjunction with a number of Northern and 
Midwestern Republican representatives. “It was the worst defeat for the VRA in 
legislative history.”74 This is the only time after the establishment of the VRA Order in 
1965 that conservatives were successful at passing a version of the VRA that disabled 
Section 5 in a chamber of Congress.   
During the House deliberations, conservatives argued specifically that the VRA 
had served its purpose, achieved success, and was no longer necessary.  To reauthorize 
the temporary provisions, they averred, was tantamount to punishing the covered states 
for achieving “success.”75 Conservative advocates cited statistics to show that registration 
and participation in some of the covered states exceeded 50%. Reviving lamentations 
expressed in 1965, opponents of the Act complained that Section 5 of the VRA treated 
covered states unequally and provided limited and inconvenient forums for federal 
review of new state voting provisions (the Department of Justice or the District Court of 
the District of Columbia). Conservatives complained especially about the intervening 
Supreme Court decisions affirming Section 5, arguing that they were unlawful.76 
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Opponents asserted that the temporary provisions were in fact unconstitutional, and that 
they imposed an “onerous burden” on covered states by the Court. These assertions were 
made despite contemporaneous Supreme Court rulings affirming the constitutionality of 
the VRA and of Section 5.   
 The successful conservative backlash in the House was beaten back in the Senate. 
Proponents of the VRA in the Senate were able to curb the influence of conservative 
arguments and the use of delay tactics against the legislation. Philip Hart (MI-D) and 
Hugh Scott (PA-R) successfully prevented Senate Judiciary chair Sam Ervin’s (NC-D) 
attempt to draw out the hearings past the August expiration date by proposing and 
securing a March 1 deadline for VRA consideration in the Senate Judiciary Committee.77  
Hart and Scott then proceeded to propose an alternative to the Mitchell bill that they 
correctly thought could win approval as its substitute. The Hart-Scott bill proposed a five-
year extension, imposed a national ban on literacy tests, removed the possibility of 
nationwide application by retaining Section 5, and included both 1964 and 1968 as 
trigger years for Section 5 coverage. By keeping the 1964 trigger year, the bill ensured 
that the original states covered under the Act would still be covered. And by adding 1968 
as a trigger year, the bill added additional jurisdictions, some outside the South, to the list 
of covered territories, which meant that Section 5 coverage, and the associated stigma 
alleged to accompany it, were no longer limited just to Southern states. 
 The Senate, without filibuster, adopted the Hart-Scott bill as a substitute for the 
Mitchell bill. Six Southern senators voted with the majority. Most Southern senators were 
anxious to appeal to their white electoral base, but they were also aware that they now 
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had to “at least consider the black vote.”78 Senator Earnest Hollings (NC-D) told an aide, 
“I’m not going back to my state and explain a filibuster against black voters.” 79 The 
Senate approved the Hart-Scott bill 64-12.80 
 Representatives in the House who were tentative about the Mitchell bill also 
supported the Hart-Scott bill. The measure provided a good alternative to the straight 
reauthorization codified in the Cellar bill and meant that Section 5 no longer applied only 
to Southern jurisdictions. Representatives who opposed the Mitchell bill also found a 
suitable alternative in the Hart-Scott provisions.81 The House approved the Hart-Scott bill 
272-132 forgoing the repeal of Section 5.    
 The 1970 reauthorization extended the temporary provisions of the VRA for five 
years. It prohibited the use of literacy tests nationwide and updated the Section 5 trigger 
to the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections. Additionally, the new law shortened the 
residency requirements for voting in presidential elections and lowered the voting age to 
eighteen.82 
 Conservative contestation of the VRA almost resulted in the loss of Section 5 in 
1970. Conservatives entered the reauthorization process in pursuit of a venue to complain 
about the provision and later used that space to make arguments against the VRA 
generally and to urge limiting the purview of the Act. Finally, opponents used delay 
tactics to achieve substantive control over the legislation. These efforts were successful in 
the House and influential in the Senate, and reveal strong opposition to the VRA as 
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originally approved by a substantial part of Congress. Put another way, the law retained 
less than the full support of Congress only five years after its initial passage. 
  1975 Reauthorization: Subdued but Substantive Dissent. The VRA continued to 
be publicized as successful in 1975; meanwhile, enforcement continued to increase black 
voter registration. To ensure the institutionalization of the VRA voting order, supporters 
of the Act proposed extending the VRA’s renewable temporary provisions for an 
additional ten years. Advocates also lobbied to pass amendments that would expand the 
Act to include protection for bilingual minorities and require some states to provide 
bilingual voting resources in areas where the number of non-English-speaking citizens 
was significant. But conservative opposition to the VRA remained active in Congress.   
Opponents broadened their offensive to include opposition to Section 5 enforcement—
begun in 1970—and to the inclusion of bilingual minorities. 83   
By 1975, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the VRA had shifted rightward. Instead 
of construing Section 5 as a wide net covering “all kinds of voting law changes,”84 the 
Burger Court began to establish limits on the purview of preclearance. (See Chapter 5). 
The executive branch exhibited ostensible support for the legislation but in fact was 
interested in ending Section 5 coverage. The Ford administration refrained from 
proposing a bill in Congress designed to neutralize Section 5 and instead expressed 
support for reauthorization. Attorney General Stanley Pottinger testified in support of 
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reauthorization, stating that despite the impressive improvement in voting rights for 
blacks, “more need[s to] be done.”85 (See Chapter 4.) 
 Conservative dissent in Congress against the VRA, though more subdued than in 
1965 or 1970, remained active. Conservatives took notice of the development of a black 
electorate and the emergence of a pro-voting-rights consensus in Congress. 
Representatives opposed to the VRA’s temporary provisions worked to counter the 
efforts of proponents but attempted, at the same time, to appear to be fair, so that they 
might appeal to both white and black voters.86 For instance, in the case of South Carolina, 
voters were split on reauthorization of the temporary provisions, and so the South 
Carolina Attorney General brought the local president of the NAACP to the House 
hearings with him so that South Carolina’s testimony would reflect the split opinion of 
South Carolina constituents.87 
 The moderated tone of conservative dissent did not mean that opposition to the 
VRA had receded. Indeed, conservatives continued working to delay the proceedings and 
making arguments against the legislation, just as they had previously done. Conservatives 
complained about the trigger years (1964, 1968) for Section 5 coverage, as well as the 
limited judicial venues (only in Washington D.C.) available for mandatory preclearance 
review. Moreover, conservatives added new arguments to include objections to the 
expansion of the Act to cover and protect bilingual minorities under Sections 2 and 5 and 
the requirement that certain states provide bilingual ballots. The opposition pushed to 
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limit the number of years of reauthorization to five instead of the ten proposed by VRA 
proponents. Conservatives again asserted statistics to show that all of the covered states 
had, by 1975, achieved better than 50% black voter registration and turnout. Dissenters 
presented witnesses who testified that none of the covered states had used literacy tests 
since 1965, and opponents made arguments in favor of relaxing the bailout provision to 
make it easier for states to escape coverage. 
 Just as they had done in 1970, VRA proponents were able to show persuasively in 
1975 that despite significant gains, covered states had not yet achieved the level of 
improvement sought by the legislation.88 The number of black elected officials remained 
low and registration had not yet reached parity. After only five years of active Section 5 
enforcement, proponents successfully asserted that repeal or limitation of Section 5 
coverage could easily result in recidivism.89 Moreover, there was still much evidence that 
covered states avoided complying with Section 5 by failing to seek preclearance for 
voting law changes. Mississippi, for example, refused to repeal its literacy test and 
continued to require it for voter registration.90 Furthermore, the Mississippi Attorney 
General refused to submit laws for Section 5 preclearance unless ordered by the state 
legislature or court order.91 Proponents urged Congress to expand coverage over some 
states where discrimination against bilingual voters was evident, and other states were 
tasked with providing bilingual ballots for voters for whom English was a second 
language.92  
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  Conservatives worked to resist and delay the reauthorization proceedings in a 
reprise of tactics employed in 1970. The chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James 
Eastland (D-MS), refused to hold hearings. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-
MO) foiled this effort by invoking a parliamentary procedure that forced the chamber to 
take up the bill unchanged from the House version. Eventually, VRA reauthorization 
proponents were able to invoke cloture, and by July, a Senate vote seemed probable.  
Reauthorization was thrown into doubt and delayed again, however, when President 
Gerald Ford renounced earlier statements urging the reauthorization of the VRA and 
announced support for a nationwide VRA.93 The President later reversed this position, 
and deliberations got back on track. (See Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the executive branch 
interference resulted in a conservative victory—a decrease in the length of the 
reauthorization. Instead of the ten-year extension pro-VRA advocates would have 
secured, the Act was renewed for only seven years.  
 Again in 1975, both chambers reauthorized the VRA, masking conservative 
opposition. The Senate voted seventy-seven to twelve in favor. In the House, three 
hundred forty-six voted in favor to fifty-six opposed.94 The 1975 bill extended the Act for 
seven years, added coverage for bilingual minorities, and mandated states covered by the 
provision to provide bilingual ballots. 
   1982 Reauthorization: Outgunned. By 1982, the pro-voting rights consensus was 
on the wane. In the 1980s, the nation shifted rightward on civil rights. The tone and 
intensity of civil rights opposition increased sharply. The Reagan administration openly 
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opposed affirmative action legislation and pushed an agenda designed to dismantle civil 
rights protections gained in the 1960s, including the VRA. The Supreme Court continued 
its movement away from liberal interpretation of the VRA to a more conservative 
position, limiting the application of Sections 2 and 5 as part of its VRA jurisprudence 
(See Chapter 5). 
In Congress the climate for voting rights had shifted away from tacit consensus 
and so improved the atmosphere for open debate by the VRA’s foes. Many Southern 
Democrats, in the period between 1965 and 1980, had switched to the Republican Party. 
Partisanship in Congress also shifted to the right. Far fewer moderate and cross-pressured 
members, essential to the establishment and maintenance of the VRA Order because of 
their willingness to compromise on civil rights issues, were in office. As a result of the 
shift in partisanship, a number of Southern Democratic lawmakers had retired and been 
replaced by Republicans. In addition, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle had 
become more ideologically aligned with their respective party centers. 95 The polarization 
evident in the 2000s began to emerge in the 1980s, though compromise was still 
commonplace.  
Conservatives (now increasingly Republican) made an earnest effort in 1982 to 
challenge the VRA on traditional grounds and by using newly developed colorblind 
arguments. Conservatives resumed their use of delay tactics and pressed hard to limit the 
impact of both Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA during the reauthorization deliberations. 
Unfortunately for their cause, right-wing Republicans did not have the external support 
they needed to significantly impede the shape of the VRA legislation. On the other hand, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Fleisher, Richard and John R. Bond. “The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress,” British Journal of 
Political Science 34 (July 2004): 429-451.  
47	  
	  
the 1982 argumentation against the VRA got some traction, which prompted 
conservatives to emphasize said argumentation during later reauthorization hearings.  
Despite these changes to the socio-political environment, conservatives had little 
success opposing the VRA in 1982. Conservatives were outgunned that year by the pro-
reauthorization lobby. The pro-VRA lobby was organized under the umbrella of the 
Leadership Conference (“LC”). Under the LC, one hundred sixty-five civil rights 
organizations once only loosely affiliated, now joined together to ensure the 
reauthorization of the VRA. The LC appointed a full time director, opened a central 
office, prepared in advance suitable proposals for reauthorization, and gathered ample 
resources for the VRA debate in the House.96   
The LC was ready and effective. Local affiliates lobbied in affected states and on 
the Hill, executed mailing campaigns on and off the Hill, and maintained phone banks to 
allow constituents to inform Congress members of their views.97 The LC took the lead in 
writing the primary legislation considered in1982, H.R. 3112, participated in all 
negotiating and rewriting, and provided the majority of the witnesses who testified in 
Congress. In contrast, the conservative bloc had no corresponding external support and 
lacked a similar well-organized plan of attack.  
 House conservatives sought support, in particular from the Reagan administration, 
but it was not forthcoming. Attorney General Edwin Meese agreed several times to testify 
in the House, but he did not do so. Outside Congress, the administration was silent on 
voting rights, making no public statements of its view of VRA reauthorization. 
Conservatives most certainly could have aligned themselves with the executive branch if 
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there had been a clear stance taken by the administration and would have gained leverage 
as a result. In mid-June, President Reagan intensified the administration’s silence when 
instead of making a position statement, he requested a report from the Attorney General 
detailing a “comprehensive recommendation [on the VRA not due until] October 1st.”98 
The hopes of House conservatives were dashed; there would be no executive support to 
lend momentum to their effort. The lack of external support, plus the strength of the 
proponents’ presentation in the House, rendered conservatives relatively powerless in the 
negotiations to reauthorize the VRA.  
The 1982 House hearings lasted for eighteen days and included two field days in 
Montgomery, AL, and Austin, TX. Conservative opponents in 1982 were very interested 
in preventing the LC’s amendment of Section 2 to allow plaintiffs to bring suits under 
that section based on either evidence of discriminatory intent or discriminatory effect.  
The amendment was designed to reverse the Supreme Court ruling in the Mobile v. 
Bolden case, which limited Section 2 review to instances where plaintiffs could establish 
intentional discrimination. Little attention was paid to Section 2 in the House debates. 
Only one day was spent exclusively on Section 2, as the rest of the time was devoted to 
Section 5 with commentary on Section 2 sprinkled throughout. Conservatives were able 
to gain very little leverage against Section 5 and did not attack the proposed amendments 
to Section 2.    
Henry Hyde (R-IL), was the face of the conservative opposition in the House. 
Over the course of the House hearings, Hyde’s opposition to Section 5 softened 
significantly. In response to testimony presented by the LC, Hyde slowly but surely 
shifted his position so that it aligned with the views of the pro-VRA lobby. At the start of 
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the House proceedings, Hyde wrote and supported an amendment, H.R. 3198, designed 
to draw attention away from the VRA proponents’ bill, H.R. 3112. The Hyde bill 
proposed a nationwide plan that would have ended preclearance, and which did not 
include amendments to Section 2. During the course of the hearings, however, in 
response to what he learned from the testimony, especially that portion presented during 
the field hearings, Hyde repeatedly rewrote his legislation, each time changing it to align 
more closely with the positions of the Leadership Council. Hyde expressed shock when 
he learned about the high level of intentional discrimination occurring in the Southern 
states. He thought it unconscionable that polling places were moved to dissuade black 
voters, that balloting was not conducted in private, and that police were stationed outside 
polls to take pictures of black voters. By the end of the hearings, Hyde believed that 
Section 5 coverage was still necessary. Hyde did support a relaxed bailout standard, but 
now as a device to motivate state actors to cease discrimination against minority voters.99 
Hyde’s opposition was not only masked but transformed by the reauthorization process.   
 Conservatives had success at delaying the 1982 proceedings in the House, which 
helped them negotiate an amendment to the bailout provision. By instigating a deadlock 
over the bailout provision, they were able to force VRA proponents to compromise on the 
bailout criteria. In a reprise of their 1975 opposition, conservatives argued in favor of 
independent bailout by jurisdictional subdivisions in covered states. The suggestion to 
allow independent bailout was a significant change to the original bailout provision.  
Previously, independent bailout for jurisdictions in states entirely covered by Section 5 
was impossible. The amendment provided a process for jurisdictions to bailout if they 
were able to show the requisite term of racially fair treatment in elections. Anxious to 
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escape the deadlock and pass the reauthorization bill in the House, proponents agreed to 
compromise and allow amendment of the bailout provision. Proponents granted 
conservatives an amendment that allowed bailout for jurisdictions in some instances 
when the entire state was not eligible for relief from coverage. 100 
 The bill arrived in the Senate having gained much momentum and overwhelming 
support—even from some conservatives—in the House. The Senate sponsors of the bill, 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Charles Mathias (R-MD), were anxious to maintain the 
pro-VRA reauthorization momentum. Kennedy and Mathias were aware that the bill 
could die in the Judiciary Committee, chaired by Strom Thurmond (D-SC). To ensure 
introduction of the bill to the floor, Mathias invoked the rarely used parliamentary rule 
XIV, one ordinarily reserved for uncontested legislation, to force the bill onto the Senate 
calendar. Kennedy and Mathias succeeded at getting the bill scheduled but the 
conservative opposition was still successful at delaying the deliberations, which were 
pushed to the start of the second session.101 At the beginning of December 1982, 
Kennedy and Mathias had to introduce an identical substitute bill, S. 1992. Sixty-one 
Senators sponsored the second session bill but some of the strong momentum gained in 
the House had been lost.  
 During the second session, conservative opponents were able to mount additional 
delays102 and take advantage of administrative support.103 Breaking his previous silence, 
President Reagan made a statement during the Senate negotiations expressing support for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Herbert, J. Gerald. An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of The Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights 
Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power, ed. Ana Henderson 
(Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press 2007), 261. 
101 Boyd, Markman. “1982 Amendments,” 1384. 
102 Ibid., 1388. 
103 Ibid., 1384. 
51	  
	  
a bailout provision that would allow jurisdictions inside covered states to bailout 
independently. He also favored an extension of the bilingual bailout provision so that its 
expiration would be concurrent with the expiration of Sections 4 and 5, and, notably, an 
intent test under Section 2 instead of the effects test sought by VRA proponents.104 The 
Attorney General reiterated these views in his testimony before the Senate.105 
 Due to the belated emergence of external support and strong conservative 
leadership, conservative opposition had some success in the Senate. Though Senate 
opposition did not result in amendments desired by the conservatives, they were able to 
stoke colorblind opposition to the VRA and maintain opposition to the VRA in the halls 
of the national legislature. Their vigorous resistance was recorded in the Congressional 
Record. Moreover, as previously discussed, conservatives were able to use delay tactics 
to slow the momentum of the reauthorization proceedings. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) chair of 
the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, led the offensive in the Senate. Hatch did 
an excellent job of organizing the Senate hearings to promote alarm about the Section 2 
amendments and to evoke and repeat controversial criticism that helped to build VRA 
opposition in Congress. Unlike Representative Hyde, Hatch was not swayed by the 
proponents’ presentation in the Senate. 
At the start of the hearings, Hatch vehemently criticized House representatives for 
failing to sufficiently address the Section 2 amendments and used that failure to focus the 
Senate hearings on the possible change. Hatch made opposition to the Section 2 
amendment the main focus of the Senate inquiry, with intermittent discussion of Section 
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5. Hatch and other conservatives stressed the fact that an effects standard under Section 2 
might result in the need to establish electoral quotas to promote the election of minority 
legislators under the VRA. The conservatives insisted that the application of an effects 
test could potentially result in an imperative of “proportional representation” in districts, 
where to date minorities had not had the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.106   
 Proportional representation and quotas were concepts that had already been 
rendered objectionable to conservatives during the Reagan administration. Hatch made it 
a point to repeat the arguments against the amendment in his opening statements each day 
during the hearings, and he used the repetition to inflame opposition against “quotas” and 
“proportional representation.” Hatch also incorporated his arguments into his questioning 
of witnesses and discussion with other committee members by focusing his inquiries and 
discussion on the potential for the undesirable outcomes. Hatch rejected the LC 
assumption that an effects test had traditionally been applied in Section 2 cases and 
argued that the amended Section 2 standard would introduce a new, unconstitutional, and 
inherently discriminatory standard of review under the VRA. Hatch’s position was 
representative of conservative dissent in the Senate. 
 Conservative senators sought nationwide preclearance and a relaxed bailout 
standard, which would allow jurisdictions in covered states to bail out independently. 
Senator Thurmond of South Carolina supported the amended bailout provision. 
Thurmond also argued that nation-wide application of the law would ensure equal 
protection of the law. Amendments were offered to counter H.R. 3112; a strongly 
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supported one was submitted by Senator Grassley (R–IA), S.1975. The proposal included 
a five-year extension, the relaxed bailout provision, and an intent test under Section 2.107   
 Despite the administration’s support, the senatorial conservative bloc still lacked 
the strong external backing enjoyed by proponents of reauthorization in the House. And 
representatives from covered states expressed less discontent with Section 5 than in 
previous years, due to familiarity with the Section 5 process, acquiescence to the 
provision, and concern for minority voter support. Covered states for the most part had 
learned to “tolerate [Section 5 requirements and constituents in covered states] and so 
applied virtually no pressure on their elected officials to repeal or weaken it.”108  HR 
3112 passed the House on October 5, 1981, three hundred and eighty-one to twenty-four 
and was later passed in the Senate, eighty-five to eight. The House subsequently 
approved the Senate’s amended version of the bill in October, 1982.  
2006 Reauthorization: Rebel Warfare. In 2006, Republican conservatives 
expressed vehement dissent against the VRA. They argued loudly against extension of 
the legislation and its temporary provisions, using all available methods. Opponents 
caused delay during the deliberations and used the Congressional Record in an 
unorthodox manner to register strong opposition to the passage of the reauthorization 
even after it was approved. Strikingly, these tactics were used by conservatives to oppose 
the VRA, despite their clear pledge of support for the legislation in advance of the 
hearings and after a publically announced promise to pass it with minimal debate. 
Ultimately, the 2006 roll call votes in both houses on the VRA reauthorization were 
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overwhelmingly in favor. Yet the dissent registered during these deliberations was the 
most intense waged during any reauthorization to date.  
By the 109th Congress, the political climate had shifted significantly since the 
early 1980s. Colorblind conservatism was now a well-developed concept, widely 
promulgated among Republicans. A trend in the executive branch to end affirmative 
action measures established during the civil rights era had been strongly supported by 
several presidential administrations. Congress was now even more conservative and more 
polarized. Congressional seats lost to retirement or election during that period were now 
occupied by representatives who were more stridently ideologically aligned with their 
party bases, removing the earlier flexibility made possible by cross-pressured members of 
both parties who were willing to compromise.109 The majority of Southern legislators in 
the 109th Congress were now staunch Republicans. Republicans controlled both chambers 
in 2006. The Republican Party had become well established as the center of opposition to 
civil rights laws passed in the 1960s, including the VRA. 
During the 2000s, the Bush administration exercised partisan influence over civil 
rights enforcement, including the VRA. Publicly, President George W. Bush expressed 
support for the reauthorization of the VRA and encouraged Republican support of the bill 
in Congress. Yet in practice, the Bush administration enforced the VRA in a tepid 
manner. The administration supported what were essentially “reverse discrimination” 
lawsuits under the VRA and appointed partisan appointees to the Voting Rights Section 
of the Civil Rights Division, the office that administered Section 5 preclearance 
applications.110 The Supreme Court also continued to shift rightward during the 2000s in 
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its VRA jurisprudence, prompting civil rights advocates to complain that the Court’s 
interpretation of the law was out of alignment with the intention of Sections 2 and 5.  
 With the 1982 VRA set to expire in 2007, Congress began to consider 
reauthorization in 2006, a year early. James Sensenbrenner’s (R-WI) tenure as chair of 
the House Judiciary Committee was set to expire. Sensenbrenner wanted the 
reauthorization to occur on his watch and be part of his legacy.111 Civil rights proponents 
were anxious to reauthorize the VRA and its temporary provisions and were concerned 
about the increasingly hostile atmosphere toward anti-discrimination legislation in the 
2000s, manifested by the presidential administrations, the courts, conservative 
lawmakers, and the general public. Proponents backed the move to consider the 
legislation early, and Republicans agreed.   
At the time the Republican Party was in the midst of a campaign to appeal to 
black voters. Part of the campaign platform included the reauthorization of the VRA. Of 
course, Republican Party support for the VRA did not placate conservative opposition to 
civil rights laws inside the party but it did provide the party a high profile opportunity to 
woo black voters. On May 2, 2006, in a rare bipartisan event on the steps of the Capitol, 
Republicans pledged to renew the Act for twenty-five years.112 The pledge signaled 
smooth sailing for the reauthorization, since Republicans tended toward extreme party 
discipline. To avoid contentious debate and to ensure the passage of the bill, both parties 
agreed to support a straight reauthorization of the VRA in Congress in 2006. It was 
expected that the VRA reauthorization would proceed quickly and uneventfully. 
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It did not. A small contingent of mostly Southern dissenters broke from the 
Republican ranks during a closed GOP meeting just prior to the scheduled House debate.  
At the meeting, Lynn Westmoreland (R-GA) led the conservative “rebels” and 
challenged the bipartisan compromise to approve a straight renewal of the VRA. 
Westmoreland argued that it would discriminate against Southern states, fail to 
acknowledge improvements made on voting rights since the Act’s inception, and be 
unfair to keep Georgia (for example) under the confines of the law, since the state had 
significantly improved its voting rights record.113 The rebels found support among 
legislators critical of coverage for bilingual minorities under Section 203. Led by Steven 
King (R-GA), VRA renewal opponents argued for the repeal of Section 203.114 “What 
people are really upset about is the bilingual ballots… [t]he American people want this to 
be an English speaking nation,” stated Rep. Charles Whitlow Norwood Jr. (R-GA).115 
The bilingual ballot discussion dovetailed with recent tension over immigration 
legislation in the House, legislation that Republicans had actively delayed. The meeting 
became so heated that James Sensenbrenner walked out.116 The scheduled House debate 
was delayed indefinitely, but it resumed about a month later. The rebels agreed to resume 
hearings on the condition that they could propose amendments. Four amendments were 
introduced, and all four failed. 
 Despite a strong façade of bipartisanship, consideration of the VRA in the Senate 
was heated.117 Hearings were held in the Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on 
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the Constitution. The issues debated in these sessions mirrored those heard in the House. 
Conservatives complained about Section 5 coverage and repeated the familiar federalism 
arguments against renewal. Debate over the bilingual provisions was also contentious, 
fueled by the ongoing immigration debate. At points, it seemed that the reauthorization 
would be held over until the next session. A potential deadlock was broken by President 
Bush’s July speech to the NAACP. The president expressed support for a straight 
reauthorization of the VRA for twenty-five years.118   
The same day as the president’s NAACP address, Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-
TN) scheduled a Senate vote and refused to allow amendments.119 Frist substituted the 
bill on the Senate floor for a bill sanctioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which 
mirrored House Bill 9 exactly, in order to avoid the need for conference committee. The 
Frist bill was approved by the Senate ninety-eight to zero, on July 21, 2006. The Fannie 
Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, César Chávez Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 was signed into law the same month.120 
The 2006 reauthorization extended the life of the VRA temporary provisions for 
twenty-five years. The content of the bill was very similar to previous bills. The Section 4 
coverage formula and Section 5 coverage requirements remained the same, meaning that 
the same jurisdictions remained covered with no new states or jurisdictions made subject 
to DOJ oversight.121 The bill did overturn two Supreme Court decisions considered to 
impose limitations on the VRA.122  
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 The civil rights lobby was aware of the need to protect Section 5 from a potential 
court challenge and so focused on building an appropriate record of support that would 
withstand a constitutional review. VRA proponents did not believe the temporary 
provisions could survive an attempt to revise the Section 4 formula, and so they focused 
on creating a record that could support Sections 4 and 5 as written. Proponents were 
aware that the standard for congressional support had changed. To be constitutional, 
proponents had to show that the legislation remained “congruent and proportional” to the 
harm it sought to restrain.123 To achieve its goal, the Leadership Council provided 
witnesses to the House Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on the Constitution.  
A foundation-backed Commission on the VRA held hearings around the country. The 
ACLU compiled an 867-page dossier on Sections 2 and 5. These and additional reports 
and articles related to renewal were added to the 2006 record.124 States covered in 1965, 
1970, and 1975 remained covered under the 2006 agreement. No new states were added 
under Section 4 subject to Section 5 coverage despite evidence of voter discrimination in 
states not covered by Section 5. 
 In an unprecedented move, Senate Republicans replaced the Senate Report, “A 
Statement of Joint Views,” with a partisan statement and published it after the hearings 
were complete. Customarily, reports are “published well before a bill is to be discussed 
on the floor, so that members can fully understand a bill’s provisions… and [they are 
usually] the result of bipartisan participation.”125 In their report, Republicans rejected the 
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supportive views published in the original report and did not seek Democratic review or 
contribution before submission.126 The ex post facto report expressed skepticism about 
the renewal process, calling it “rushed” and criticized the retrogression standard 
supported by proponents of the reauthorization legislation. Democrats, concerned about 
the report, stated that it “undermined the case supporting the constitutionality of the law,” 
and concluded that the report was designed as an invitation to challenge in the Supreme 
Court.127   
 Conservatives were arguably heartened by the idea that a straight reauthorization 
of the temporary provisions would leave the Section 4 formula and Section 5 intact. By 
leaving the formula and coverage provisions unchanged, there was a greater likelihood 
that the section would be challenged and a lesser chance of its surviving Supreme Court 
review. The Roberts Court was extremely amenable to hearing cases demanding the 
consideration of civil rights law because part of the Chief Justice’s agenda was to limit 
affirmative action provisions. The Court’s conservative wing believed that the 
contemporary cultural framework demanded amendment or repeal of the VRA and other 
civil rights protections, thereby allowing state sovereignty to operate freely and therefore 
limit federal involvement in state police powers. 
 In fact, six days after the reauthorization was signed into law North West Austin 
Municipal Utility District (MUD) filed a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5, in 
federal court.128 Ostensibly a request to determine whether a Texas water utility district 
should be subject to Section 5, the real issue in the case concerned whether or not Section 
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5 was constitutional, i.e., whether or not the evidence presented in Congress satisfied the 
Boerne “congruence and proportionality” standard in the 2006 reauthorization hearings. 
In the MUD decision, the Court implied that Section 5 of the VRA was probably not 
constitutional without amendment and strongly suggested that Congress adjust the 
coverage formula to avoid a fatal Supreme Court ruling on the issue in the future.129 
 Conclusion: The Long Game and External Support. The available evidence 
shows clearly that conservatives in Congress worked diligently and repeatedly to erode 
and impede the reauthorizations of the VRA between 1970 and 2006 but with little 
success.  The end of the 2006 hearings resulted in the reauthorization of the VRA without 
amendment of Sections 4 or 5. The “new” legislation was challenged and reviewed by a 
Supreme Court with a new conservative majority. The Court was able to use the fact that 
the legislation was unrevised to argue that the law needed to be revised and later it was 
able to strike an important section of the law. (See Chapter 5). This is in part due to the 
fact that polarization in Congress prevented the revision of Section 5 in 2006. Thus, the 
success at the Supreme Court was in some degree due to the failure of conservative 
opponents of the VRA to make progress undermining the Act on the floors of Congress. 
Congressional conservatives will likely prevent any future revision of Sections 4 and 5 
because polarization in Congress has eroded the basis for compromise. At this point, even 
minor alterations that might revive Section 4 in the eyes of the Supreme Court and make 
Section 5 operational again, will be very difficult to secure.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Presidents and the Voting Rights Act, 1970-2013 
    
Presidents between 1965 and 2013 have shifted to the right on the enforcement of 
the Voting Rights Act. Lyndon Johnson brought the law into being, yet even his 
enforcement effort was limited and reserved. Johnson was concerned about the electoral 
impact of legislation like the VRA. He is said to have declared that his support of civil 
rights legislation would cost the Democratic Party its southern support for a generation. 
He focused his attention on registration, did not operationalize Section 5, and did not use 
observers at the polls in nearly as many jurisdictions as he might have. 
 All of the presidents since Johnson have been influenced by conservative 
opposition in their enforcement of the VRA, especially as the ideology of colorblind 
conservatism acquired legitimacy. Republican presidents, pursuing a race-oriented 
strategy to build a durable party majority, have been predisposed to oppose the Act. Some 
have resisted general enforcement but selectively enforced the Act; others have stood the 
act on its head by using it to undermine its purpose of restoring and/or ensuring the rights 
of minority voters. Democratic presidents have been constrained in their enforcement of 
the Act by the rise of colorblind legal ideology or conservative pushback. On balance, no 
president since Lyndon Johnson has had the same high level of commitment to the VRA 
and the opportunity to enforce it as enthusiastically. 
 This chapter will demonstrate the impact of colorblind conservatism on the 
enforcement of the VRA by the executive branch. I begin with Republican presidents 
from 1970 through 2008, exploring their participation in VRA reauthorization, their 
rhetoric, the activities of the Department of Justice under their administrations, and 
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Republican presidents’ appointments to the executive branch and federal judiciary. Next I 
examine the VRA legislative activity, rhetoric, actions and appointments of Democratic 
administrations. I demonstrate that presidents between 1970 and 2013 shifted rightward 
on the VRA and decreased enforcement in response to the influence of conservatism.  
When necessary, the discussion will include consideration of presidential treatment of 
civil rights regulation generally, on the premise that a presidents’ civil rights policy 
includes voting rights.  
The Moderate Republican Era: The Nixon and Ford Administrations. According 
to Steven Shull, there was a “clear break” in presidential advocacy of civil rights that 
began in the late 1960s and lasted until the mid-1970s.130 Civil rights enforcement once 
dominated by legislation and court order; now became the responsibility of federal 
agencies in the executive branch.131 Republican presidents, responding to the VRA in the 
early years, were influenced by a moderate conservative platform dedicated to limiting 
civil rights reform. But these conservative presidents served in the midst of a broadly 
accepted liberal consensus in favor of affirmative action-based reform of past racial 
discrimination. In the early 1970s, civil rights legislative remedies were expected to be 
utilized and Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford were obligated to instruct the 
DOJ to administer and enforce affirmative action legislation and the VRA. Constituents 
demanded the establishment of affirmative action programs and the enforcement of anti-
discrimination legislation achieved by the civil rights movement. Both presidents 
expressed rhetorical opposition to the parts of the VRA Southerners found offensive––
part of Nixon’s Southern Strategy—and both presidents tried to take legislative action to 
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neutralize the strength of the offending temporary provisions when the Act came up for 
reauthorization, but both signed reauthorizations and complied with VRA enforcement in 
fact.    
The civil rights records of the two presidents reveal politically nuanced support of 
civil rights goals. Both presidents were rhetorically against busing and discouraged the 
use of affirmative action in employment, but at the same time Nixon and Ford supported 
and enforced affirmative action measures like the Equal Rights Amendment and the 
Philadelphia Plan, which set goals for the hiring of minority contractors through the 
Department of Labor.132 President Nixon also issued Executive Order 11478, which 
mandated the institution of affirmative action programs in federal agencies and 
departments.133 Nixon and Ford’s discussion about/enforcement of the VRA was 
accomplished in a similar fashion, contrary rhetoric followed by enforcement.    
When given the opportunity to influence the substance of the VRA during the 
reauthorizations of 1970 and 1975, Presidents Nixon and Ford supported limiting or 
repealing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Both submitted amendments designed to 
neutralize the power of Section 5 over Southern states, but to little avail. Nixon and Ford 
signed reauthorizations of the VRA and both enforced the Act. Of the Republican 
presidents, the Nixon and Ford administrations were influenced least by colorblind 
conservative principles and were the most vigorous enforcers of civil rights legislation 
generally and the VRA in particular. If measured by the number of objections issued to 
state voting laws, Nixon and Ford appear to be the most vigorous of all presidents in 
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VRA enforcement134. Yet this appearance of vigor is due in part to the high number of 
non-conforming jurisdictions in the early years. The Nixon and Ford administrations 
were characterized by rhetorical opposition to but actual enforcement of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
 Nixon’s opposition to the VRA arose out of his celebrated “Southern Strategy.” 
The Southern Strategy sought to capitalize on cracks in the Southern wing of the 
Democratic Party opened by President Johnson’s endorsement of civil rights legislation 
in the 1960s. In his effort to win white voters formerly unreachable by Republicans, 
Nixon ran his campaign on a “states’ rights,” “law and order” platform. This anti-
affirmative action positioning appealed to those Southerners interested in maintaining 
traditional racial values and social relations. In the 1972 presidential election, the strategy 
contributed to Republican victories in five former Confederate states that had long been 
strongholds of the Democrats. For Nixon, the VRA was objectionable because it 
stigmatized Southern states for past wrongdoing (wrongdoing supported, of course, by 
states’ rights proponents) and because it demanded that Southern states submit to federal 
oversight of voting law changes in violation of traditional federalism relations.   
 The VRA temporary provisions came up for reauthorization for the first time in 
1970. The Nixon administration took the opportunity to challenge the legislation. The 
administration proposed opposition amendments to the VRA that would minimize the 
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mandate imposed by Section 5 and remove the stigma imposed on the Southern states.135 
The Nixon amendments advocated the removal of Section 5 from the VRA, empowering 
the attorney general instead to take action against any state (not just the covered states) 
that discriminated in its use of voter qualifications and procedures.  The amendments also 
made it legal for the Attorney General to bring a VRA action in any federal court rather 
than limiting review to the District Court of the District of Columbia.136 If the Nixon 
amendments had been successful, the category of covered states would have been 
removed from the statute, to be replaced by a nationwide ban on literacy tests, and the 
special venues for voting law review by the federal government would have ended.  The 
changes would have removed the stigma imposed on Southern states and also implicated 
Northern states guilty of voter discrimination.137 The amendments also would have 
reduced the strength of the VRA by removing federal oversight and preclearance review, 
and they would have limited voter discrimination relief to litigation.138 As noted in the 
previous chapter, the Nixon amendments passed the House but failed in the Senate. (See 
Chapter 3). 
 Nixon publicly expressed his reluctance to sign the 1970 VRA re-authorization by 
commenting that he only signed the bill “to prevent the Goddamned country from 
blowing up!”139 In the midst of protests over the incursion by U.S. troops into Cambodia, 
continuing civil rights protests, and the Kent State shootings, Nixon calculated that a 
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failure to sign the “most successful piece of civil rights legislation” might have been 
worse politically than the potential backlash resulting from a deviation from the Southern 
Strategy. Nixon was forced into a similar conundrum with other affirmative action 
programming. He rhetorically opposed busing but enforced it in several jurisdictions. He 
ostensibly opposed affirmative action but established the first federally funded 
affirmative action program. And, Nixon supported the Equal Rights Amendment. The 
Nixon administration’s contradictory posture toward satisfying his obligation to civil 
rights legislation was beneficial in the early years of VRA administration.  
 After initially pledging support for the reauthorization,140 Gerald Ford opposed 
renewal of the VRA in 1975. The Ford amendments sought again to remove the bite of 
Section 5 by “increasing the jurisdiction of the VRA to all 50 states, and the elimination 
of the need for covered states jurisdictions.”141 Ford also suggested the imposition of a 
national residency requirement on citizens voting in national elections.142 Ford did 
succeed temporarily in creating doubt about what were thought to be easy deliberations to 
pass the reauthorization. The presidential disruption did influence the 1975 bill. The 
presidential intrusion resulted in a decrease in the proposed ten-year reauthorization 
period to seven years. However, the disruption was short-lived and unsuccessful at 
limiting the controversial sections. Like his predecessor, Ford failed in his attempt to 
neutralize the controversial substantive aspects of the VRA mandate. The VRA 
reauthorization passed the House and the Senate. The legislation signed by Ford did not 
include a national residency requirement, did not limit Section 5, continued the 
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proscription of covered states, extended the VRA for seven years, was expanded to 
include protections for language minorities, and permanently barred literacy tests 
nationwide. Ford signed the reauthorization of the legislation and enforced the Act 
vigorously.    
Enforcement of the VRA by the Moderate Republican Presidents. The Nixon 
administration issued Section 5 guidelines in 1970. Prior to 1970, some states refused to 
submit voting law changes under Section 5 and others were willing but did not 
understand what to submit. Once the 1970 regulations were in place, Section 5 
enforcement began in earnest and covered states became active at submitting voting law 
changes during the Nixon and Ford administrations. One measure of the strength of 
enforcement of the VRA is the number of objections issued by the DOJ against state law 
submissions under Section 5. Under the Nixon administration, objections increased over 
prior years, when there had been no objections. There were 729 objections issued by the 
DOJ in 1969-1970 and 6,900 objections filed between 1970 and 1975. The United States 
Commission on Civil Rights statistics indicates that the peak year for Section 5 
objections was 1976. By this measure, Nixon and Ford were the most vigorous 
presidents, Republican or Democrat, in their enforcement of the most controversial 
section of the VRA. 
Conservative Republicans and the VRA: Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and 
George W. Bush Administrations. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush (“Bush 41”) 
presidencies were characterized by stronger ideological resistance to anti-discrimination 
law, including the VRA, but based on the number of DOJ objections, enforcement of the 
law during these administrations did not decrease significantly in comparison to the 
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presidents who preceded them. One of the Reagan administration’s goals was to reduce 
the enforcement of anti-discrimination protection. Unfortunately for him, the president 
failed to make the necessary changes in the federal bureaucracy required to produce that 
shift across all of the agencies responsible for administering civil rights protections. 
Reagan did make inroads, however, into limiting some protections, and he contributed 
greatly to building the far-right conservative ideology that supported the dismantling of 
affirmative action. He also established an effective method to undermine civil rights 
initiatives later used very successfully by George W. Bush.   
George H. W. Bush followed Reagan’s lead on civil rights and the VRA, but was 
more timid about taking stances against civil rights laws because he feared the fallout 
generated by the Reagan administration’s head-on confrontations over civil rights 
legislation. Reagan and H.W. Bush were more conservative in their administration of the 
VRA than either Nixon or Ford. Still, both Reagan and Bush did enforce the law in a 
manner consistent with its authors’ intent. Consideration of the Reagan and Bush 41 
presidencies reveals that they helped build support for a conservative agenda on civil 
rights and the VRA, but they could not dislodge the liberal consensus in favor of civil 
rights.  
The Reagan Administration: Opening the Door to the Republican Right. Prior to 
Ronald Reagan, modern Republican presidents could be termed moderate conservatives.  
Reagan ushered in a renewed focus on conservative resistance to civil rights gains in a 
“departure from core civil rights legal values.”143 Reagan’s agenda incorporated a quasi-
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renewed “Southern Strategy” dedicated to dismantling civil rights’ protections 
established in the 1960s. Reagan was unable to demolish federal anti-discrimination 
legislation and he was compelled, however reluctantly, to enforce the VRA. On an 
ideological level, however, Reagan opened the door to a conservative counterrevolution 
that has since grown considerably in institutional power and popular support. The 
administration’s open disdain for race-based civil rights protections and its attempts to 
limit their scope helped to legitimize the conservative counterpoint of view. Even though 
the program as a whole was not immediately successful, it contributed to the long-game 
against the civil rights gains of the 1960s.  
Ronald Reagan challenged civil rights law and ideology head-on. But because 
Reagan took office “at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical measures of 
equality,” his efforts to oppose the liberal consensus in favor of the VRA faced concerted 
resistance. 144 Reagan sought to redirect civil rights protection. He openly expressed his 
ideological stance and confronted established civil rights law.145 Reagan’s predecessors 
in the Carter administration had increased incentives for minority entrepreneurs, 
established a number of race- and gender-conscious initiatives that expanded protection, 
and enforced “traditional” liberal civil rights legislation, including the VRA.146  Reagan 
argued publicly that the Carter programs were faulty. He complained that “equal 
opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which 
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rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to exclude some individuals in favor of 
others, thereby rendering such regulations . . . discriminatory.”147   
It was difficult for Reagan to make systematic changes to civil rights enforcement 
due to the interplay of the influence of the liberal consensus and the decentralization of 
civil rights enforcement across the executive branch. His administration failed to force 
the broad shift away from vigorous civil rights enforcement that he sought,148 but the 
administration made progress on some projects and increased the salience of racial 
conservatism within large segments of the voting public. Unable to neutralize the liberal 
consensus as a whole, the president focused on decreasing relief to minorities on only a 
few civil rights issues: he attempted to return tax exempt status to racially discriminatory 
schools, to remove Mary Frances Berry and others among her colleagues from the 
independent bipartisan U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, to lead DOJ attacks on 
preferential hiring, and to oppose the VRA’s use of disparate impact under Section 2 as 
evidence of discrimination in voting rights cases.   
The effort waged in Congress during the 1982 reauthorization to exclude the 
disparate impact standard applied under Section 2 of the VRA was unsuccessful. The 
opposing efforts by a strong and well-organized civil rights lobby prevented eradication 
of the standard. Expressing the established perspective of the civil rights consensus, civil 
rights advocates sought to renew the Act and secure the right to bring causes of action for 
discrimination supported by findings of disparate impact. (See Chapter 3). 
The Reagan administration’s opposition to the 1982 reauthorization of the VRA 
was cut short. The administration felt compelled to change its position because it could 
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muster very little traction in Congress in the face of a strong minority lobby, which had 
the power to gather enough votes to pass a liberal version of the legislation. At issue in 
that session was the reauthorization of Section 5 and a proposed amendment to a 
permanent provision of the VRA, Section 2. Supporters of the VRA wanted Congress to 
reauthorize Section 5 and to amend Section 2 to include language explicitly stating that 
discrimination in Section 2 lawsuits could be established either by evidence of intentional 
discrimination or by evidence of discriminatory effect. Evidence of discriminatory effect 
had been excluded as an option for establishing discrimination in a Section 2 lawsuit in 
the Mobile v. Bolden (1980) decision, in which the Supreme Court upheld an at-large 
election for city commissioners when the plaintiff’s proffer of discriminatory effect was 
rejected. 149 Traditionally, civil rights attorneys had used either evidentiary standard 
(intent or effect) to establish discrimination in at-large state voting systems. Accordingly, 
the loss of the discriminatory effect option resulted in what was essentially a moratorium 
on Section 2 lawsuits. 
The Reagan administration expressed concern about the establishment of quotas 
for minority public officials and opposed the Section 2 amendment during the 1982 
reauthorization. The administration’s proposals included limiting the preclearance 
requirement to only specific named offenses under Section 5, shifting the burden of proof 
of discrimination to the DOJ (so that only laws affirmatively opposed by the DOJ might 
suffer rejection by the federal government), and retaining the Mobile v. Bolden decision 
as the standard under Section 2. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, 
deliberations in Congress were controlled by a well-organized pro-voting rights lobby led 
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by the Leadership Council. The Council proved to be a formidable opponent of 
conservative Republicans in Congress on the issue of reauthorization and amendment. 
The Reagan administration was unable to overcome the strong liberal coalition in 
favor of the VRA, and in fact lost its primary “soldier” in the House during the 
reauthorization hearings. Henry Hyde (R-IL), the face of conservative opposition, began 
the hearings staunchly convinced that Section 5 should not be renewed but was converted 
during the House hearings and became a supporter of the reauthorization of Section 5.  
Support for the VRA was also strong in the Senate. (See Chapter 3). Senator Bob Dole 
(R-KS) informed the president that a version of the VRA legislation that included Section 
5 preclearance and an amended Section 2, would pass despite opposition by the White 
House.150 After speaking with Dole, Reagan endorsed that version of the VRA. Reagan 
may have had concerns about the potential political blowback generated by opposition to 
the VRA. The Act was extremely popular among and widely supported by minority 
voters, and the administration was certainly aware that some fifty Republican 
congressional districts relied on the black vote.151 Boasting that “[the] legislation proves 
our unbending commitment to voting rights,” Reagan signed a reauthorization of the 
VRA in 1982, legislation, which strengthened voting rights for minorities.152  
The Reagan administration did make progress at countering the intent of some 
civil rights initiatives, using methods subsequently employed by other presidents. In 
particular, Reagan used his appointment power to resist some anti-discrimination 
mandates and to lay a foundation for the later repeal of affirmative action programs. For 
example, in 1982, Reagan appointed Clarence Thomas to the chairmanship of the Equal 
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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which proved to be an effective means 
of resisting the anti-discrimination mandates established at the EEOC. Thomas adopted a 
non-confrontational, indirect approach against EEOC enforcement. Instead of speaking 
out against existing equal employment legislation or attempting to repeal it, Thomas 
changed the ideological direction of EEOC enforcement within the pre existing 
guidelines.153 Reagan and his DOJ faced many attacks from civil rights groups and the 
media on issues of discrimination but none about the administration of the EEOC.  
Clarence Thomas was able to advance the goals of the Reagan administration without 
suffering backlash from interest groups.154  Thomas changed the priorities of the EEOC, 
restructured it, and crafted an unassailable justification for the changes,155 which allowed 
him to further the aims of conservatives, placate liberals, and avoid complaint and 
resistance. Thomas “shift[ed] scarce agency resources from disfavored to preferred policy 
objectives,” the agency was able to make conservative policy progress while avoiding 
direct confrontations with Congress.156  
 Reagan’s appointments to the Supreme Court and to lower federal courts helped 
to lay a foundation for the eventual reversal of some affirmative action programs and the 
VRA. Appointees Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with Reagan that 
affirmative action discriminated against whites and that affirmative action was ineffective 
at combating racism.157 Scalia subsequently took the helm of the conservative coalition 
within the Supreme Court and O’Connor provided intermittent, more moderate support of 
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limitations on anti-discrimination law. Reagan also appointed William Bradford 
Reynolds to the position of Assistant Attorney General, Clarence Pendleton to the chair 
of the Civil Rights Commission, and, as discussed, Clarence Thomas to the chair of the 
EEOC. Each of these appointments and others like them increased the conservative 
influence over the activities of the executive branch and the federal courts. This method 
of changing the personnel and thus ideology of civil rights initiatives was used extremely 
effectively by George W. Bush during his presidential term.  
Reagan Administration Enforcement of the VRA.  The Reagan administration was 
constrained in its ability to limit enforcement of the VRA. Although critics complained 
that the enforcement of the VRA under Reagan was “flaccid,”158 this may be an unfair 
characterization of the Reagan DOJ. Bullock and Butler show that “[t]he incidence of 
proposed changes for 1981 and 1982 is similar to that during the last half of the Carter 
presidency,” though the rate of objections during the first two years was lower than the 
preceding administration.”159 Bullock and Butler surmise that the Carter DOJ may have 
issued more objections during the first two years of the Carter administration due to the 
increased responsibility for Latino voters established during the 1975 reauthorization.  
The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights noted a record number of VRA objections 
based on gerrymandering not seen during earlier administrations.160 The Reagan 
administration did file fewer cases under the VRA than Carter “though the first few years 
of each term were similar.161 The number of observers dispatched under the Reagan 
administration in 1982, 461, was the highest number ever dispatched for a single 
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election.”162 Bullock and Butler aver that “[c]ritics may be correct in saying that more 
could be done under President Reagan, but a charge that voting rights enforcement has 
been ignored is not supported. …”163 
 George H.W. Bush and the VRA. George Herbert Walker Bush (“Bush 41”) 
expressed his objections to anti-discrimination law less forcefully than Reagan despite a 
similar agenda and strong conservative bias. Having seen the difficulties endured by the 
Reagan administration in its effort to challenge civil rights head on, Bush 41 tried to 
divorce himself from direct involvement in civil rights issues. As a result, he lost the 
support of both conservatives and civil rights proponents alike. He vacillated on 
controversial civil rights issues like the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 (seeking to 
protect against job discrimination and providing the right to jury trial on discrimination 
claims) and Executive Order 11245 (providing equal employment opportunity). Bush 41 
spoke publicly in favor of civil rights but maintained an effort to challenge civil rights 
legislation. “Bush sought to have it both ways. His brinkmanship, an attempt not to 
displease the right or the left, was designed to save him from the fires that so consumed 
the Carter and Reagan administrations.”164   
 Yet Bush 41 did expand the influence of conservatism on the federal government.  
He had the opportunity to replace two justices on the Supreme Court. Both of the 
departing justices replaced by Bush 41 were liberals, giving him the opportunity to 
increase the conservative base on the Court. To conservatives, he missed one opportunity 
to redirect the Court. His selection of Justice David Souter proved to be “one of the 
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biggest political blunders of a Republican president in the 20th Century.”165 Souter was an 
unknown commodity at the time of his appointment, but many perceived him as a true 
conservative. As his record would show, however, Souter was not a slave to the 
conservative agenda once he got his seat on the Court. Instead, he became a reliable 
liberal, at least on civil rights matters. Bush 41 was successful at creating a more 
conservative Court when he appointed Clarence Thomas, and he has indeed served as a 
reliable member of the conservative bloc on the Court since his arrival and a strident 
opponent of Section 5 of the VRA.  
 The George W. Bush Administration. George W. Bush (“Bush 43’) was more 
successful at challenging civil rights protections than his Republican predecessors. His 
administration benefited from the development of conservative anti-discrimination 
legislation ideology and popular hostility toward affirmative action programs. Bush 43 
combined the conservative posture, the ostensible support of civil rights protections 
exhibited by his father, and the appointment techniques introduced by Ronald Reagan.  
By exercising more control over appointees to the various agencies of the Executive 
Branch responsible for enforcing civil rights, Bush 43 was able to decrease enforcement 
of the VRA.  
Publicly, George W. Bush expressed support for the VRA. His support for 
reauthorization of the VRA at the 2006 NAACP convention contributed to the passage of 
the bill. The NAACP speech broke a deadlock on the floor of Congress on VRA 
reauthorization. The same day of the speech, the bill returned to the House floor and the 
Speaker maneuvered the bill through the conference committee to avoid further potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




delay. The bills emerging from the House and the Senate were identical, except for the 
titles, and therefore could be adopted easily, absent discussion about the slight differences 
in the caption.166 (See Chapter 3).  
By contrast, Bush 43 took steps to derail VRA enforcement. Like Reagan, the 
Bush administration benefited from challenges to civil rights initiatives that operated 
under the radar. He adopted Clarence Thomas’ EEOC approach for the Voting Section of 
the Department of Justice. Instead of pushing to repeal the VRA or proposing 
amendments to weaken Section 5, Bush replaced the career personnel at the DOJ who 
were responsible for enforcing voting rights with political appointees who redirected the 
focus of the voting rights section away from minority voter protection. The 
administration supported the proposal and passage of state voter ID laws and other 
restrictions that worked against the mission of the VRA. The administration also used the 
law to bring suits to protect white voter claims that challenged VRA enforcement 
designed to enhance the voting rights of minorities.  
Bush 43’s approach spurred the departure of 60% of the career employees of the 
DOJ Voting Rights Section.167 New appointees to the DOJ were selected for their 
political viewpoint, and those appointees in turn selected new employees based on 
political criteria. In one major voting rights case involving Alabama and Georgia, the 
DOJ filed legal briefs supporting positions rejected by career DOJ employees.168 Career 
employees spoke about the significant changes to the Voting Rights Section of the DOJ 
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and complained about the refusal of the administration to adhere to the spirit of the 
law.169 The administration supported Indiana’s voter ID law in an amicus brief. The 
government’s brief argued that voter fraud was a disincentive to lawful voters. At the 
time of the Indiana case, there were no recorded instances of voter ID fraud in the history 
of the state.170 The brief downplayed evidence that support of the ID law was partisan and 
the fact that most Indiana voters who lacked the necessary identification to vote were 
poor and minority voters, a state of affairs that the VRA legislation is designed to 
avoid.171 John Atlas argues that the Bush (43) administration energized the search for 
voter fraud as a method of disenfranchisement of minority voters in key battleground 
states.172 The Bush administration failed to bring any voting cases under the VRA in the 
first five years of the administration, except one in support of white voters in 
Mississippi.173 The administration precleared laws that would not have been so approved 
by its predecessors. It also endorsed the “DeLay” Texas redistricting plan, despite the 
conclusion of career employees that the plan violated Section 5’s retrogression 
standard.174    
The Bush 43 DOJ filed an amicus brief in favor of the state of Florida when the 
Brennan Center of New York sued the state under Section 2 of the VRA to ban a law that 
permanently disenfranchised ex-convicts. Career members of the Bush DOJ and 
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newcomers holding a traditional civil rights ideology, such as then Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder and former Solicitor General Seth Waxman, filed amicus briefs in 
support of the Section 2 lawsuit.175 The administration was also supportive of ending 
affirmative action admissions programs in the University of Michigan cases.176 
Additionally, and perhaps tellingly, Bush cut funding to civil rights enforcement.177  
George W. Bush had a significant impact on the ideology of the Supreme Court.  
The Bush 43 appointees are solid conservatives who have increased the number of 
conservative decisions in contrast with the Courts that preceded them. Prior to the Bush 
administration, seven of the Supreme Court justices had been appointed by Republicans, 
yet most decisions on issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and individual rights 
(including voting), disappointed conservatives.178 On many key cases, the Court ruled 
five to four, with O’Connor casting the deciding vote in unison with the Court’s liberal 
bloc. Both Rehnquist and O’Connor announced their intention to step down during the 
Bush 43 administration, which meant that the president had the opportunity not only to 
name the next Chief Justice, but also, by nominating two conservatives, to change the 
balance on the Court. Bush named Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, 
both staunch conservatives, to the Court. Since then, on issues of affirmative action and 
voting rights, the Court’s decisions have shifted definitively to the right, including the 
MUD and Shelby v. Holder decisions on the VRA. (See Chapter 5). 
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The Democratic Presidents. On the whole, Democratic presidents from 1970 
onward were more supportive of the VRA than their Republican counterparts. None of 
the Democrats have been responsible for signing a reauthorization of the VRA, so none 
has had the opportunity to attempt to amend the Act or to defend the reauthorization of 
the temporary provisions during a high profile reauthorization process. Despite belonging 
to the Democratic Party, which supports the VRA, Democratic Presidents since 1970 
have not shown the level of aggressive support exhibited by Lyndon Johnson or the high 
level of enforcement exercised by Nixon and Ford. This situation is a direct consequence 
of the development of conservative opposition to civil rights and its subsequent growth. 
As the political environment has become more conservative, civil rights protections have 
come under attack and the movement for civil and voting rights has faded.  
The Carter Administration on Civil Rights. Before ascending to the presidency, 
Jimmy Carter had a decent civil rights record as the governor of Georgia. He declared in 
his gubernatorial inaugural speech that “segregation was over and that racial segregation 
had no place in the future of the state,” marking the first such public commentary from a 
governor from the Deep South.179 Carter went on to hire blacks to statewide positions and 
made more of an effort to support desegregation efforts than his predecessors. Four out of 
five blacks supported Carter in his election as a result of his civil rights record.180 As 
president, “Carter believed in racial equality” and engaged in a policy of civil rights 
enforcement in large part through executive orders.181 Carter continued this trend while in 
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office, appointing more diverse candidates to “federal leadership positions, including 
cabinet, sub- cabinet, White House, and judiciary positions than any prior president.”182 
  The Clinton Administration and the VRA. President Bill Clinton recognized the 
importance of diversity in the nation’s population as a political, cultural, and social 
reality. During his presidential campaign, he highlighted plans to increase diversity in 
government, improve civil rights enforcement, and break the cycle of poverty.183 It was 
clear that while the nation had diversified, there were still “major disparities between 
whites and minorities in health status, unemployment rates, wages, and other key 
indicators of overall well being.”184 This state of affairs signaled the need to address civil 
rights issues less as a moral imperative and increasingly as a practical necessity. 
 Against this background, Clinton asserted a strong moral and rhetorical stance in 
favor of civil rights and proposed a strong civil rights agenda and a willingness to address 
a number of issues that had formerly been neglected. He sought to diversify the federal 
government and its programs and increase funding for civil rights enforcement.185 From 
the outset, the administration alerted its agencies of the importance of “addressing non-
compliance with federal civil rights law, including violations involving disparate 
impact.”186 Clinton was aggressive about using executive orders and memoranda to 
further civil rights aims. Yet despite his strong stance and agenda, he was unable to 
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realize much of his civil rights agenda. His administration found itself stymied by a lack 
of Congressional support, poor implementation, and poor funding of civil rights 
enforcement agencies. 
 Because no VRA reauthorization occurred under Clinton’s presidency, he never 
had the opportunity to take a position on the validity of the temporary provisions or to 
make proposals to amend the VRA. All the same, the record shows that Clinton 
supported voting rights. In 1993, he signed the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 
which also sought to reverse the effects of discriminatory and unfair voting laws by 
expanding the systems available for registration. The NVRA instituted mail-in 
registration and made it possible to register to vote in conjunction with getting a driver’s 
license.187   
 The Clinton administration’s support for the disparate impact standard in the 
enforcement of civil rights protections affected its support for voting rights. In 1994, 
Attorney General Janet Reno issued a memo to federal department heads, reiterating the 
directive to apply the disparate impact standard in civil rights enforcement.188 The DOJ 
applied the standard in Section 2 VRA cases in accordance with Reno’s directive and the 
1982 VRA amendments. As a result, the drawing of majority minority districts became 
the most common remedy applied in Section 2 challenges to state districting complaints 
under the VRA.189 Majority minority districts became the subject of challenge litigation 
after the 1990 census.   
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 The Clinton administration expressed its support for the districts and the disparate 
impact standard in its amicus brief in an important 1994 case, Shaw v. Reno, and worked 
through its Department of Justice to uphold the redistricting plans. Resistance to VRA 
relief plans ensured that voting rights remained a controversial issue at the end of the 
1990s. Clinton acknowledged in a 2000 speech that “serious flaws in the mechanics of 
voting,” still existed.190 
 The Barack Obama Administration and the VRA. The Obama administration has 
expressed support for the VRA and a dedication to protecting the law. The 
administration’s approach to VRA enforcement has been contentious, despite the fact that 
there has been no reauthorization of the VRA during the Obama presidency. The 
development of a strong conservative opposition to the legislation, not to mention the 
work of the Republican Party and political entrepreneurs to propose and pass voter ID 
laws and to challenge the constitutionality of the VRA, have made enforcement of the 
VRA challenging for the Obama administration. The developments of the 2000s have 
meant that the Obama administration has had to enforce the Act in a hostile environment, 
defend the VRA against sustained attack, and ultimately begin to retool race-based voter 
rights protections after the Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the VRA is 
unconstitutional, effectively removing all states from coverage under Section 5 of the 
VRA. 
By the time Obama entered office, the liberal consensus was no longer the 
predominant force undergirding voting rights law in the United States. Conservatives 
based in the Republican Party had, by 2008, developed an ideological basis for 
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challenging the liberal consensus that resonated with the public, had built support around 
challenging the VRA, and had developed support for their position in the Supreme Court.  
The election of Barack Obama, the first black president, motivated an increase in 
conservative resistance to the VRA. Minority voters exhibited strong support for Obama 
and Republicans became convinced that they could not entice Obama supporters to 
support the Republican Party. This was a change of view by the Republicans who made 
an effort to attract minority voters during the late 1990s and early 2000s. That effort 
subsided by the mid-2000s, and gave way to a push for voter ID laws and constitutional 
challenges to the VRA.  
State Voter ID Laws and Related Developments. The conservative campaign to 
propose and pass voter ID and similar laws began in the early 2000s. In 2005, Indiana 
passed a voter ID law that was subsequently upheld by a federal court.191 In 2000, 
however, the proposal and passage of voter ID laws had not yet become a national trend.  
Voter ID laws, even in uncovered states like Indiana, pose an issue under the VRA. The 
laws arguably burden voters who are minorities, poor, and elderly; many of these voters 
have been shown, in the affected states, to have less access to sources to obtain voter IDs, 
and are more injured by limitations on early and absentee voting.192 Republican 
legislators in favor of voter ID and similar laws argue that the provisions are designed to 
minimize voter fraud, a hotly contested justification due to overwhelming evidence that 
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affected states show little or no record of recent voter fraud.193  During the first few years 
of the Obama administration, the DOJ had some success limiting the expansion of voter 
ID and similar laws in covered states and implementation of the laws. In the wake of two 
major Supreme Court decisions, it has been harder in recent years for the administration 
to combat voter ID and similar laws in covered and uncovered states. 
 Obama Administration Enforcement of the VRA.  According to a US Commission 
on Civil Rights 2010 report, the Obama DOJ Section 5 enforcement has been “apolitical 
… fair… and consistent.”194 The Commission held that the enforcement methods and 
statistics were similar to those of the Bush 43 administration. The Commission described 
the Obama DOJ preclearance process as friendly to redistricting plans, and reported that 
the administration did not discriminate against Republican-controlled legislatures.195 In 
2011, the DOJ approved every plan submitted—twenty-six nationwide plans submitted 
by nine states. Six of the submitting states were controlled by Republican legislatures.  
The only plan challenged by the DOJ was the Texas plan, which was submitted for 
preclearance not to the DOJ but to federal court.  The cycle marked the first time in 
history that Georgia and Louisiana received full administrative preclearance on the first 
attempt.196  
 Between 2011 and 2012 the Obama DOJ issued two effects-based administrative 
objections and only a few intent-based objections.197 At the time the report about the 
2010 census was written, numbers for 2012 were not available, and so the Commission 
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refrained from commenting on any trends indicated by these two types of objections.  
The Commission did indicate that the DOJ followed its own guidelines (though some 
states, Texas in particular, registered some complaints that the guidelines were not 
clear.)198 The Commission report also indicated that the DOJ was applying a similar 
standard to that used before the 2006 amendments in its assessment of intent-based 
objections, indicating that the DOJ took a conservative stance on objections to 
submissions.199   
The Commission noted that the number of preclearance petitions submitted to the 
DOJ simultaneously with court filings or by court filing alone increased significantly.200  
The increase was huge compared to past cycles.201 In 2011, twelve lawsuits were filed for 
preclearance; between 1972 and 2010 there had been a total of only 28 lawsuits.202 The 
Commission discussed a number of reasons for the shift in practice including timing, 
better discovery, the belief that simultaneous filings would improve the odds of getting 
DOJ approval, and a belief that the DOJ would not clear the plans from particular 
states.203 The report claims that the reason for the shift is not clear. The implication is that 
states began to resist DOJ oversight in favor of federal court. A court decree under 
Section 5 would preclude further preclearance by the DOJ under Section 5.  
Important to the Commission’s report, however, are the numerous statements of 
dissent by commissioners involved in preparing the report. Several raised the issue of the 
influence of the “constitutional overhang” of the Northwest Austin v. Holder case and the 
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pending Shelby v. Holder case.  The commissioners complained that there was a gag 
order on the Civil Rights Commission, which prevented commissioners from discussing 
the constitutionality of Section 5 and the relevance of the upcoming Supreme Court 
decision. These commissioners did not argue that Section 5 was unconstitutional but 
indicated that the lawsuits were an important influence on state behavior that was worth 
mentioning and discussing in the 2010 redistricting report. 
 DOJ Enforcement 1970 -2010. During the course of the VRA’s enforcement, 
relatively few objections have been issued. Since 1965, the number of voting law 
submissions objected to by the Department of Justice has “declined steadily to the point 
of relative insignificance.”204 In every category of submission, the number of objections 
by the DOJ has decreased. Over the same period, the number of submissions has 
increased drastically. From August 1965 until June 2004, jurisdictions filed 117,057 
voting change submissions for administrative review. The department issued objections 
to 1400 or 1.2%.205 In a Civil Rights Commission report breaking the relevant period into 
three sections, 1965-1974, 1975-1982 and 1982-2004, the Commission found that the 
DOJ interposed objections to 14.2% of submissions during the first period, 3.1% during 
the second period and 0.7% during the third.206   
According to the 2006 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, objections peaked in 1976 
or 1986 depending on the metric used. Ninety percent of all voting law changes 
submitted before 2006 were submitted after 1982.207 Since 1982 there have been a 
number of Supreme Court cases clarifying the boundaries of the Section 5 requirement, 
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which has resulted in more filings.208 Also after 1982, states and local governments have 
submitted changes in a timelier manner, as compared with submissions during the 1965-
1974 period when submissions were often late or not submitted at all.209 Most states and 
local jurisdictions submitted changes to the DOJ; however, during the Obama 
administration, there has been an upsurge in filings with the district courts. Between 1972 
and 2010, covered jurisdictions filed twenty-eight total lawsuits, a rate of about three per 
year. In 2011, thirteen lawsuits were filed in district court. Some of the redistricting plans 
at issue in the lawsuits were simultaneously filed with the DOJ.210 
 The statistics reveal that compared to the number of voting law changes, oversight 
by the federal government has not resulted in a high number of instances in which states 
must change their laws. The upshot is that interference with state government has been 
relatively low and likely less of an intrusion than many VRA critics think. White voters 
are in fact still privileged under the VRA Order, despite the improvement in voting power 
of blacks and other minorities. There has not been a complete abandonment of state 
sovereignty or majority voters under the VRA. Presidential enforcement of the VRA has 
not resulted in a complete transfer of control of state voting laws to the federal 
government. 
 Conclusion.  Notable about the results discussed here is that conservatism has 
affected the enforcement of the VRA during both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. The last two administrations, Bush 43 and Obama, are extremely 
important because the impact of colorblind conservatism is highly visible. Bush 43’s 
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contradictory enforcement of the Act by using political appointees and aiming the 
legislation to remedy discrimination not identified by the Congressional purpose of the 
VRA resulted in a significant shift in VRA implementation. The government declined to 
assist minority voters and brought lawsuits under the VRA on behalf of whites. Bush 43’s 
nomination of additional colorblind conservatives to the Court also hindered the 
application of the Act during and after his terms. In order for federal anti-discrimination 
laws to be effective, the states must respect it. The activities of the Bush 43 
administration reveal that the long game against the VRA at the federal level resulted in a 
loss of respect for the enforcement of the VRA. 
 During the Obama administration, the DOJ has had significant difficulty wielding 
the oversight authorized by Section 5. This prevented the Obama administration from 
successfully objecting to voting law changes and put the executive branch in the position 
of having to defend Section 5 at the Supreme Court. State push back against the Act 
allowed states to maintain and implement regulations that arguably discriminated against 
minority voters. After the Supreme Court decision in Shelby v. Holder, state laws 
objected to under Section 5 were implemented without recourse by the Obama 
administration pursuant to the VRA. These changes in enforcement are not readily visible 
to the public. Because the presidents between 1965 and 2013 are known to have enforced 
the VRA, the subtle deterioration of the enforcement of the legislation in the executive 





Chapter 5  
The Supreme Court and the VRA, 1970-2013: 
Bending Toward a Colorblind Voting Order 
 
Richard Valelly correctly observed that positive initial review by the Supreme 
Court provides a strong foundation for anti-discrimination law. The Court’s first review 
of the Voting Rights Act in the 1966 decision, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, affirmed 
the constitutionality of the legislation, including the temporary and controversial Section 
5.211 As a result of the South Carolina v. Katzenbach decision, the legislation’s unique 
feature mandating federal oversight of state voting law changes in covered states was 
subsequently treated as “a valid means for carrying out the 15th Amendment.”212 The nod 
from the Supreme Court fueled the ongoing application of the VRA, motivated full-
fledged application of Section 5, and added solidity to the foundation of the VRA Order.  
But despite Valelly’s confident assertion about the enduring impact of positive initial 
Supreme Court review, it does not assure the ongoing support of the judiciary.  As the 
membership of the Court has become more conservative and colorblind conservative 
ideology has grown in influence, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the breadth and 
application of the VRA has narrowed significantly. 
The shift to a colorblind conservative interpretation of the VRA by the Court 
occurred gradually. Early on, the Court began to narrow the application of Section 5, and 
over time it continued to pull back from broad applicability. Recently the Court disabled 
the application of Section 5 entirely.213 The influence of colorblind conservative 
principles on the VRA resembles the impact of anti-discrimination legislation 
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jurisprudence of the Court after Reconstruction. In both instances, the interpretation of 
voting rights as un-protectable voided statutes designed to enforce the 15th Amendment. 
The shift by the Court to a restrictive view of the VRA occurred more slowly than the 
analogous post-Reconstruction review. The Court’s jurisprudence has severely limited 
the VRA, a development that contradicts Valelly’s assertion that the VRA became 
securely entrenched as a result of robust party organization and positive initial review by 
the Supreme Court. While the Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
benefitted the VRA regime and provided stability, positive initial review did not result in 
permanence or make the legislation incontestable. In fact, because the legislation 
received positive initial review, conservatives against the Act were motivated to engage 
in a long game against it. The opposition has slowly but surely developed and 
strengthened its position in the Supreme Court, as the Court’s members have included 
more Republican-appointed conservatives, negatively impacting the VRA.  
This chapter evaluates the development of Supreme Court VRA rulings between 
1966 and 2013, through a review of the Court’s major decisions. The chapter is divided 
by Court—Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts—and uses a selection of VRA 
decisions to illustrate the development of VRA jurisprudence. My study confirms a 
rightward trajectory in Supreme Court VRA decisions. The study also explores the 
substance of conservative arguments on the Court, provides insight into how those 
arguments have changed, and illustrates the relationship of conservative jurists to other 
political actors on the Right. 
The Warren Court. The Warren Court was often considered an activist Court in 
favor of civil liberties. Chief Justice Earl Warren led a liberal majority that regularly used 
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judicial power to expand civil rights, civil liberties, and judicial and federal power.214 
Others on the Court, notably William Brennan, Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Abe 
Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall, formed liberal majorities and were able to control 
decision making.215 Cass Sunstein avers that “[t]o many people, the idea of judicial 
deference to the elected branches lost much of its theoretical appeal in the 1950s and 
1960s, when the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was 
invalidating school segregation (Brown v. Board of Education), protecting freedom of 
speech (Brandenburg v. Ohio) striking down poll taxes (Harper v. Board of Elections), 
requiring a rule of one person, one vote (Reynolds v. Sims), and protecting accused 
criminals against police abuse (Miranda v. Arizona).”216 Rebecca Zietlow counters that in 
fact the Warren Court was less activist than the Rehnquist Court, since it only struck 
down seventeen acts of Congress in contrast to the Rehnquist Court’s thirty-three.217 
Nonetheless, the rulings of the Warren Court were controversial, considered protective of 
minorities, counter-majoritarian, and activist. The jurisprudence caused much 
consternation in conservative circles. 
The Warren Court did not disappoint on the issue of voting rights. In its first VRA 
decision, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court sanctioned Section 5 as “appropriate 
legislation” to enforce the 15th Amendment.218 In the lawsuit, South Carolina argued that 
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the VRA’s prohibition against the use of “tests and devices” at the polls and the 
intervention of federal examiners violated states’ right to implement and control 
elections. The Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Earl Warren opined that the 
legislation was a legitimate exercise of remedial powers of the federal government to 
prevent racial discrimination in voting and approved the use of the unique remedy 
contained in the legislation to respond to the “insidious and pervasive evil” exercised by 
states to deny blacks the right to vote since the 15th Amendment’s adoption in 1870.219  
The decision was not unanimous. Justice Black concurred with the majority on 
the constitutionality of the legislation but issued the lone dissent on the validity of 
Section 5. Black argued that the section’s ability to allow the federal government to strike 
down a state law in the absence of a traditional case or controversy was flawed and that 
the power violated the federalism boundaries established in the Constitution. Black 
opined: “Section 5, by providing that some of the states cannot pass state laws or adopt 
state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities 
to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to 
render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost 
meaningless…States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.”220 
Blacks’ dissent did little to minimize the momentum inspired by the majority 
opinion. The potential negative impact on federalism under the VRA did not dissuade the 
Court, VRA advocates, or the Department of Justice from moving forward on VRA 
enforcement. The Johnson administration surged onward with registration drives and 
federal oversight of some polls.   
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Subsequent Warren Court decisions in Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969) 
and Gaston County v. United States (1969) augmented the South Carolina decision and 
ensured the applicability of Section 5 to a broad range of state voting law changes.221 In 
Allen, the Court interpreted Section 5 as applicable to a broad range of voting law issues.  
The Court affirmed that private litigants could sue pursuant to Section 5 when states 
approved any new voting law. The Court cited Congressional intent to make Section 5 
applicable to “subtle as well as obvious state regulations which have the effect of denying 
the right to vote because of race.”222 Dicta in Allen indicated that “any voting change in 
any covered electoral system” was subject to Section 5 and that continuing electoral 
discrimination was forbidden and therefore constitutionally regulated by the federal 
government.223   
An influx of Section 5 submissions followed.224 To that point, Section 5 had not 
been actively enforced. Official guidelines for preclearance submission had yet to be 
issued and enforcement was not comprehensive. In fact, several covered states and 
localities intentionally made voting law changes without seeking preclearance review in 
order to counter the impact of the VRA. The Allen decision began a trend toward 
enforcement and compliance with Section 5.225 In 1970, the DOJ issued preclearance 
guidelines and began systematic review of preclearance petitions.226  The support of the 
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Supreme Court allowed the VRA regime to expand beyond registration drives and federal 
poll watching and made operational the unique remedy provided by the legislation.227 
The Supreme Court continued its support of a broadly applied VRA in the 1969 
Gaston County v. United States decision.228 The Court in Gaston affirmed the district 
court ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider the use of a literacy test in Gaston County, 
North Carolina, and the Court affirmed the lower court decision to deny reinstatement of 
the test. The county had “systematically deprived its black citizens the educational 
opportunities it granted its white citizens” such that voting age blacks might be unable to 
negotiate a literacy test, and therefore the provision violated the VRA.   
The Warren Court’s record of VRA jurisprudence reflects acceptance of the 
legislation and a relatively liberal interpretation of the statute, more liberal than any of 
the subsequent Courts. Warren Court decisions affirmed the constitutionality of the 
legislation and interpreted the intent of Congress to favor broad application. The Court 
applied the statute’s remedial power to a wide range of voting rights changes and voting 
schema that minority voters alleged discriminated against them under the Act.229   
The Burger Court. The Burger Court was generally supportive of the VRA. They 
did not question the constitutionality of the legislation and largely upheld the application 
of Sections 2 and 5 in a manner approved by the liberal consensus. However, the Burger 
Court was not willing to apply the VRA as liberally as had its predecessor. Under Chief 
Justice Warren Burger’s leadership, the Court narrowed the application of Section 5.   
Burger Court VRA jurisprudence shifted squarely away from comprehensive 
Section 5 coverage of all voting law changes. Thus, not every voting law change was 
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subject to Section 5. In Connor v. Johnson (1971) the Burger Court ruled that U.S. 
District Court decisions related to electoral apportionment could escape subsequent 
Section 5 review. “A decree of the United States District Court is not within reach of 
Section 5 of the Act,” said the Court. 230 Subsequent Conner litigation did provide 
Section 5 review of laws passed after the litigation, even laws under development during 
the litigation process, but the decision meant that states could avoid preclearance of 
apportionment plans by taking preclearance-related litigation to district court.231 District 
court orders were now unreviewable by the DOJ even if they caused a negative impact to 
black voters. 
The Court refused to grant Section 5 relief in an instance when it felt that changes 
to black voting power were negligible. In City of Richmond v. United States (1975), the 
Court overruled the district court holding that the institution of a ward plan that included 
an annexation that decreased the black voter population by 10% was racially 
motivated.232 The Court approved the ward plan because it left black voters with what it 
called a “proper share” of political power in Richmond, despite the annexation and 
resulting decrease in eligible black voters. Although the Court had held in the 1971 
Perkins case that annexations were subject to Section 5,233 the majority in Richmond 
minimized the significance of the apparent contradiction: “We did not hold in Perkins 
that every annexation effecting a reduction in the percentage of Negros in the city’s 
population is prohibited by Section 5.”234 
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In Richmond, the Court refused to equate a decrease in the proportion of black 
voters, where there had been a history of voting discrimination, as prima facie violation 
of Section 5. Rather, the Court held that it was not the intent of Congress to make every 
state voting law change subject to federal oversight. According to the Court, to rule in the 
alternative would have set too broad a precedent. A majority of the Court thought that 
since the Richmond annexation maintained viable electoral power for the district’s black 
residents, the action did not have the effect prohibited by Section 5 and therefore should 
not be restricted. The dissent in Richmond argued the opposite, contending that the 
annexation was racially motivated, that it was a voting law change, and that Section 5 
preclearance should apply.235 
 Following the Richmond decision, the Court further clarified its approach to 
Section 5 in Beer v. United States (1976) by establishing the retrogression requirement.236  
In Beer, the city of New Orleans complained that the Department of Justice denied its 
petition for preclearance of the city’s 1970 city council districting plan. In its decision, 
the Burger Court opined that Section 5 denials of preclearance applied only to voting law 
changes that caused the “retrogression” of black voting power. In other words, unless 
there was a clear negative impact on black voters, i.e. a marked decline in black voting 
power, a law was not voidable. State action to improve voting opportunity for blacks in 
the community was not required; state action could only be curtailed when it caused a 
sufficient decrease in black voting power.  
The standard of review established in Beer decreased the purview of Section 5 
applicability. Only those voting law changes that significantly decreased minority-voting 
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power were disallowed under Section 5. Changes that caused a minimal decline in power, 
maintained the status quo, or resulted in only a negligible increase in voting power were 
exempt from interference by the Department of Justice based on the authority provided 
by the VRA. The Court expressed concern about setting too broad a purview for Section 
5. These decisions evidence a retreat from the more comprehensive and liberal standard 
set by the Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections. They also express a contrary view of 
the intention of Congress to that described in earlier decisions.  
On the other hand, many rulings reflected the Burger Court’s willingness to abide 
by the VRA mandate. In White v. Regester (1975) the Court agreed nine to zero that a 
Texas redistricting plan “invidiously excluded” blacks and Mexican Americans from 
“effective participation in political life, specifically the election of representatives to the 
Texas House of Representatives.”237 In White, the Court upheld a Texas redistricting plan 
that mandated single member districts to improve minority voter influence.  Mandates to 
establish single member districts in several covered states benefitted minority voters 
especially in localities that switched to at-large districts as many jurisdictions had done in 
response to the passage of the VRA. Similarly, in United Jewish Organization v. Carey 
(1977), the Court upheld as lawful the DOJ’s demand that Brooklyn districts be drawn 
with race as a consideration, despite the loss of voting power of white Hasidic voters in 
New York City. 238 And, the Burger Court refused to allow individual jurisdictions inside 
covered states to bail out of Section 5 coverage independently. In City of Rome v. United 
States (1980), petitioners sought to escape from VRA coverage independent of the state 
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of Georgia.239 The Court maintained that individual jurisdictions within a state could not 
be released from coverage independently when a state was covered under the VRA in its 
entirety.240 Conservatives were not happy with the City of Rome ruling.241  
In United Jewish Organizations (U. J. O.). v. Carey and Thornburg v. Gingles, the 
Court also approved the drawing of majority minority districts as part of relief pursuant to 
redistricting plans, viz. creating districts which provided minority voters an improved 
opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice.  In U.J.O., 242 the Court said that if a 
majority minority district did not dilute the white vote, “compliance with a Justice 
Department Voting Rights Act objection is a complete defense to a lawsuit challenging 
the creation of new majority minority districts.”243 A decade later the Court reaffirmed its 
sanction of majority minority districts and established a framework to determine whether 
a district was lawful.        
In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) the Court ruled that majority minority districts 
could be drawn in instances where there had been “severe and persistent racially 
polarized voting” in the past, worthy of remedy. The Court set baseline requirements to 
determine whether a district was appropriate. The Thornburg decision set “three 
threshold conditions for establishing a Section 2 violation: (1) the racial group must be 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member 
district; (2) the group must be politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority must vote 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable [the bloc] to … usually … defeat the minority’s preferred 
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candidate.” The state legislature attempted in Shaw, pursuant to DOJ directives, to draw a 
district that encompassed a voting bloc like that described in Thornburg but was denied. 
The Burger Court also limited VRA relief under Section 2. In a watershed case, 
Mobile v. Bolden (1980), the Court overturned a precedent that provided Section 2 
plaintiffs the option of establishing a case of voter discrimination based on discriminatory 
intent or discriminatory effect. The Mobile decision determined that plaintiffs must show 
that districts were drawn with discriminatory intent in order to provoke constitutional 
protection under Section 2. In Mobile, plaintiffs made a clear showing that the effect of 
the district system was to prevent blacks from electing candidates of their choice under 
the city council at-large election system. The Court ruled that “action by a state that is 
racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if it is motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.”244 The city of Mobile’s at-large election system had been 
established in 1911 and was arguably not instituted as part of an intentional plan to 
discriminate against black voters or to evade the dictates of the VRA. The decision was 
devastating to Section 2 lawsuits nationwide. VRA attorneys, convinced that intentional 
discrimination was almost impossible to prove, refused to accept new Section 2 litigation, 
while judges presiding over Section 2 cases stayed the litigation for failure to articulate a 
case.  
The change to Section 2 jurisprudence imposed by the Mobile decision set the 
main agenda for the 1982 reauthorization hearings—the amendment of Section 2. (See 
Chapter 3). Proponents of the Voting Rights Act Order proposed an amended Section 2 
that provided for both forms of proof —intent and effect.  Conservatives argued against 
overturning Mobile. The conservative opposition argued that to allow remedy for 
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unintentional discrimination was akin to a mandate for “proportional representation,” 
despite the explicit denial of such a mandate in the letter of the amendment.245 
Conservatives made much of the argument that only electoral plans that ensured equal 
descriptive representation would subsequently pass muster under the Voting Rights Act. 
(See Chapter 3). 
 John Roberts, then a special assistant to the Attorney General, was the point 
person for the Reagan administration’s response to the Section 2 amendments. He agreed 
that an effects test might lead to “quota systems” in electoral politics and did not believe 
that the “savings clause” in the bill removed that danger. “Just as we oppose quotas in 
employment and education, so too we oppose them in elections.”246 The idea of 
proportional representation was abhorrent to conservatives, and created an effective 
wedge issue. Still, VRA proponents ultimately prevailed and amended Section 2 to 
include both bases for action.   
 The Supreme Court promptly heeded the change in the law. In accordance with 
the 1982 amendment, the Court retreated from the Bolden standard. In Rogers v. Lodge 
(1982),247 which was argued during the 1982 reauthorization process but decided after its 
conclusion, the Court applied an analysis that was in sync with the new legislative 
language.248 Justice White, who dissented in the Mobile v. Bolden decision, wrote for the 
Court to void an at-large election system in Burke County, Georgia. “[A]lthough the state 
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policy behind the at-large electoral system was ‘neutral in origin,’ the policy was being 
maintained for invidious purposes in violation of appellees' Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment rights.” The system prevented blacks from being elected and was maintained 
in an effort to perpetuate invidious discrimination. Because the law resulted in 
discrimination against black voters, there was a viable basis for Section 2 relief that the 
Supreme Court respected.   
The Court was also responsive to the 1982 amendments in its Thornburg v. 
Gingles (1985) decision.249 Filed before the reauthorization, Thornburg, a Section 2 case 
from North Carolina, was heard after the Act had been reauthorized. The issue in 
Thornburg concerned the efficacy of seven districts established in the 1980 redistricting 
process. In the decision the Court applied a “totality of the circumstances” test to 
determine that that the majority of the new districts in fact violated Section 2 because in 
effect they diluted the black vote.   
Some have referred to Burger Court VRA jurisprudence, as creating a “foot in the 
door for the Rehnquist Court’s later application of colorblind jurisprudence and the 
subsequent death of minority voting rights.”250 This seems to go too far in reading 
subsequent developments back into an earlier period. The Court treated VRA application 
more sternly than the Warren Court, but was respectful of the liberal consensus and of 
Congress’ adjustments to the legislation.  
Abigail Thernstrom: Colorblind Conservative against the VRA. The 1980s 
marked a positive shift in conservative criticism against affirmative action law. “If the 
1960s had been a time of opportunity for liberal critics, the 1980s were boom time for 
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critics of liberalism.”251 This criticism included the VRA. The emerging conservative 
critique of the VRA tracks the career of Abigail Thernstrom, whose scholarship 
contributed significantly to the development of colorblind conservative theory at the 
Supreme Court. Her intellectual brief against the VRA presaged arguments subsequently 
adopted and used by conservative members of the Supreme Court.   
In her 1978 book, The Odd Evolution of the VRA, Thernstrom argued that the 
VRA was “odd” because it was no longer being used for its original aims: to remove the 
traditional roadblocks used to disenfranchise black voters, like poll taxes and literacy 
tests. Instead it was being applied to make sure that “blacks and language minorities,” 
like Mexicans in Texas, were elected to office based on their numerical strength. 
Essentially, so Thernstrom argued, the Act had been converted from a tool designed to 
allow the franchise to serve as a means used to guarantee that minorities could elect the 
representatives of their choice.252 Thernstrom maintained that the Allen decision changed 
the VRA into something not contemplated by the Congress under Section 5. Allen, said 
Thernstrom, “permanently blurred the distinction between disenfranchisement and 
dilution,” and created a foundation for a “ward system” of proportional representation.253 
Thernstrom’s 1987 work, “Whose Votes Count,” became a “veritable bible” for 
conservative jurists, including five who often formed a majority on the Rehnquist Court 
in the late 1980s.254 Thernstrom’s arguments have continued to influence the conservative 
justices on the Roberts Court. Clarence Thomas’ first reference in his Holder v. Hall 
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concurrence is to Thernstrom,255 citing her interpretation of the shift in the application of 
the VRA as both accurate and, as Thernstrom argues, problematic. 
Thernstrom’s critique of majority minority districts also strongly influenced the 
Supreme Court.256 She argued that such districts were essentially improper racial 
gerrymanders that resulted in proportional representation. This ultimately meant that 
remedial action under the VRA was an improper use of racial consideration by the state.  
The Court later adopted this assumption. On this particular subject, Thernstrom’s 
arguments influenced the Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno (1994) and VRA 
jurisprudence to follow.257 In Shaw, as part of relief to white plaintiffs challenging a 
minority district, the Court rejected the district based on the fact that it was drawn based 
solely on racial considerations. Applying strict scrutiny to state districting, the Court held 
that such electoral line drawing was akin to apartheid.258 
The Rehnquist Court: Conservatives Begin to Wield Power. Beginning in 1986 
and ending in 2005, the Rehnquist Court bridged the period between the throwback Jim 
Crow conservatism, largely delegitimized by the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 
1960s, and the emergence and ultimate ascendance of colorblind conservatism between 
the 1980s and 1990s. The maturation of colorblind conservatism as a respected ideology 
included arguments directed against the VRA. The threat of proportional representation, 
stoked at the 1982 reauthorization hearings, provided fuel and justification for colorblind 
arguments against the VRA in the public sphere and at the Supreme Court.  Even as the 
Rehnquist Court demonstrated ostensible deference to the VRA, conservative justices 
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narrowed its application, and limited allowable remedies. The Supreme Court expressed 
increasing doubts about such measures as the drawing of majority minority districts, 
which were required by the DOJ under Section 5 and by lower courts under Section 2.  
The shift in the Court’s jurisprudence became especially pronounced when it began to 
apply strict scrutiny to state action taken pursuant to the VRA. 
Changes in membership resulted in an increasingly conservative Court. Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, a proponent of a conservative view of affirmative action prior 
to his elevation to lead the Court in 1986, penned or signed on to a number of decisions 
that narrowed the VRA during his tenure as Chief Justice. 259 On the Burger Court, 
Rehnquist had often been the lone dissenter on voting rights cases. But as a result of 
appointments to the Court by President Reagan ( Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981, Antonin 
Scalia in 1986, and Anthony Kennedy in 1988), the views of the majority eventually 
came into alignment with Rehnquist’s. The Rehnquist Court’s agenda was facilitated in 
part by the departure of two justices important to decision making aligned with the liberal 
consensus. Both Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan Jr. retired from the Court 
during the Rehnquist years: Brennan in 1990 and Marshall in 1991. Their departure 
resulted in a marked shift rightward in Supreme Court jurisprudence. By the mid-2000s, a 
core of conservatives on the Court, including Scalia and Thomas, were often joined by 
the moderate conservatives (O’Connor and Kennedy) and wielded much power. As 
Chief, “Rehnquist helped transform a bench preoccupied with the rights of the poor and 
disenfranchised into one that …[preferred to leave societal problems to the legislature.]” 
The Court “reduced protections for criminal defendants, curtailed Congress’ power in 
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local affairs, and…made a point of boosting states’ rights at the expense of federal 
power…and limited the Court’s role in pushing goals such as school desegregation and 
prison improvements.”260 
 One result of the 1982 Section 2 amendments was a shift in the response of the 
DOJ to preclearance submissions and a corresponding shift in the Court’s response to 
DOJ mandated remedies, particularly the drawing of majority minority districts in 
redistricting challenges. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, the most common DOJ 
response to redistricting challenges under Section 5 or Section 2 was to order the 
establishment of majority minority districts.261 The remedy became especially 
pronounced after the 1990 census and resulted in the election of a significant number of 
blacks to Congress. The increase in black elected officials due to districting pursuant to 
the VRA stoked dissent against the VRA in the public and judicial spheres. “The striking 
increases in the number of majority-black and majority-Hispanic districts triggered a 
white backlash that focused on the use of race in drawing majority minority districts and 
on the shapes of some of the districts.”262 White voters in five Southern states (North 
Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas and Florida) alleged that the creation of majority 
minority districts violated their right to equal protection, and subsequent lawsuits raised 
the issue in additional jurisdictions.263 The Court became increasingly intolerant of 
majority minority districting during the Rehnquist term.  
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 In Presley v. Etowah County (1992), after the election of the first black district 
commissioner in Etowah, Alabama, the Supreme Court held that state officials’ decision 
to decrease the powers of commissioners, removing authority over road maintenance and 
expenditures in their districts, did not fall under the purview of Section 5.264 Minority 
plaintiffs argued that the county had not sought preclearance before it significantly 
altered commissioner duties. The Court concluded that coverage of each and every 
electoral change would be overly burdensome to the many districts inside a covered state 
and would leave federalism “… a mere poetic ideal.”265 Again, we see the Court refusing 
to apply the Allen standard and consider all voting changes under Section 5. The decision 
penalized the first black officeholder and provided no recourse under the VRA. This was 
a marked shift away from the purpose of the Act, to open the franchise and its fruits to 
minorities.  
 “White backlash” lawsuits became commonplace during the term of the 
Rehnquist Court. A landmark lawsuit, the North Carolina case, Shaw v. Reno, was 
decided in 1993. Brought under the VRA and the 14th Amendment, the case ultimately 
was decided under the Equal Protection Clause. White citizens of North Carolina sued to 
void the districting plan for North Carolina ordered by the DOJ pursuant to Section 5.  
The plan included the addition of a second majority minority district that was unusually 
shaped. The shape of the district in particular led the members of the Supreme Court to 
deem the districting plan design to be based solely on race. The Court denied the 
constitutionality of the plan, finding that it lacked consideration of traditional redistricting 
measures. A deeply divided Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause did not permit 
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an election law or redistricting plan that “. . . goes beyond what [is] reasonably necessary 
to avoid retrogression.” 266 The Court refused to uphold any districting plan that classified 
citizens solely on the basis of race.267 
The Court’s belief that the district shape was based on the consideration of race 
was not unreasonable; the district was drawn to accommodate minority voters. However, 
the shape of a district is not necessarily indicative of unlawful racial motive. District lines 
often fail to conform to neat shapes because of geography and because populations are 
not spread evenly across geographical areas. Also, it seems unreasonable for the Court to 
use the Equal Protection Clause to void 15th Amendment protection. The purpose of the 
VRA is to prevent discrimination against minority voters. The VRA was not designed to 
protect white voters. However, at the crux of colorblind conservatism is the idea that 
whites should not be discriminated against by civil rights benefits granted to minorities, 
that is, that civil rights legislation includes whites thereby voiding any “special 
treatment” of blacks. The Court’s decision here and in other cases directly applies 
colorblind conservatism to the enforcement of the VRA. These decisions change the 
purview of enforcement and hinder the potential for the enforcement of the Act to 
improve minority voting rights. 
This was a significant departure from precedent,268 but lawsuits like Shaw quickly 
became relatively commonplace—cases brought by white plaintiffs claiming to have 
suffered discrimination due to VRA enforcement—and the Court continued its 
interpretation of the VRA as a tool to protect white voters. Tellingly, white plaintiffs who 
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lodged lawsuits against majority minority districts were not required to meet the same 
standards as were minority plaintiffs attempting to bring challenges to secure VRA relief.  
White plaintiffs were neither required to satisfy the Gingles criteria nor show injury due 
to the creation of majority minority districts to their voting power. The fact that the 
districts were drawn based on race was generally enough to justify the standing of 
residents to object. 
 In Shaw, the Court essentially ruled that race could be considered as a districting 
variable but that racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional. The Court did not make clear 
where the line between consideration and quotas lay, and it used the shape of the district 
analysis to avoid stating plainly that remedial action under the VRA was considered 
unconstitutional. 269 According to Shaw, any district considered strangely shaped by a 
federal court judge could be struck due to lack of compactness. Civil rights attorneys 
complained that Shaw chilled states’ motivation to settle voting rights cases because the 
remedies being requested would violate Shaw. 270 Mark E. Rush argues that Shaw “was a 
call to Congress to clarify the vision of representation and voting rights that is manifested 
in the VRA.” 271  
The Court continued to issue decisions narrowing the application of the VRA by 
limiting state action under the Equal Protection Clause, and by reducing the scope of 
Sections 2 and 5. The Court continued to tolerate suits by white plaintiffs without 
requiring that those individuals show injuries induced by DOJ-ordered VRA decrees.  
The shift in the Court’s jurisprudence is similar to that which occurred with higher 
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education affirmative action case law. Schools once obligated to establish affirmative 
action policies to facilitate the admission of minority students were barred from 
considering race exclusively. Instead, under the Bakke line of cases, schools could 
consider race, but never exclusively, in making admissions decisions. Essentially, the 
“over-consideration” of race as part of an effort to cure past discrimination became 
unconstitutional. By the mid-1990s, state action under the VRA could take race into 
account, but it became unlawful to make race alone the primary consideration. The 
purpose of the VRA became inherently suspect in the eyes of the Court. 
In Holder v. Hall (1994), the Court disallowed an increase in commissioner seats 
in a district where no black commissioner had previously had the opportunity to serve 
and simultaneously narrowed consideration for minority voters sought under a 
combination of Section 2 and Section 5.272 The Court rejected the district court decision 
that the state of Georgia had a responsibility to increase the number of seats on a school 
board commission from one to five. In fact, the Court held that as a category, challenges 
to the size of a governing body are not cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA. The Court 
held respondents (black citizens) accountable for justifying the requested alternative—a 
five-member commission (the number approved by voters for consideration, but which 
was later voted down by ballot)—and complained that that there was no clear standard 
against which to measure the proper size of a commission. Under the pre-existing single-
member commission system, solely white commissioners had controlled the county seat 
since 1912. But the Court held that “there [was] no principled reason why one size of a 
government authority should be selected over another.”273 The Court resisted opening 
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minority office holding opportunities under the VRA. Furthermore, the Court in applying 
the Gingles standard did not consider that the black community qualified for relief under 
the Act.  
In response to respondents’ argument that the change in the size of a commission 
was reviewable under Section 5, and therefore also under Section 2, the Court averred 
that though it had indicated in the past that Sections 2 and 5 were essentially the same, 
the Court had not officially sanctioned the interchangeability of the causes of action 
pursuant to each. “We do not think that the fact that a change in voting practice must be 
precleared under Section 5 necessarily means that the voting practice is subject to 
challenge in a dilution suit under Section 2.”274 The Court went on to analyze the 
differences in the purposes of Section 2 and 5, starkly distinguished retrogression from 
dilution. The implication of the decision was that the purposes of the two sections did not 
overlap. The Court called the distinctions made between the two sections of the VRA 
“quite unremarkable.”275 Though the jurisprudence of Sections 2 and 5 has varied over 
time, the purpose of the VRA as a whole is to eradicate race-based voter discrimination. 
Barring claims arising under Sections 2 or 5 from consideration under the other section, 
inevitably limited and restricted the purview of the VRA.276 
The Court did not go as far in Holder v. Hall as Justice Thomas would have.  
Thomas averred that the question should be considered from a statutory perspective.  
According to Thomas, the plain letter of the law does not cover the size of a commission 
because that aspect of a governing body is not a “standard, practice, or procedure” within 
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the terms of Section 2.277 More important, Thomas objected to voter dilution claims. He 
argued that they are impossible to adjudicate under Section 2 because the analysis 
demanded that judges apply political determinations about what constituted dilution.278 
Thomas quoted Shaw v. Reno to assert that the application of remedies under Section 2 
resulted in the “racial balkanization of the Nation,” and he cited Abigail Thernstrom to 
support his assertion that the VRA had been “converted from its original aim into a 
device for the regulation, rationing and apportioning of political power among racial and 
ethnic groups.”279 
The Court also increased the level of review of state action under the VRA, 
making VRA relief less secure. In Miller v. Johnson (1995) the Supreme Court 
overturned a districting plan designed under DOJ supervision under the VRA.  In Miller 
the Court applied strict scrutiny to the state action taken pursuant to the VRA. Strict 
scrutiny was used according to the Court because “[r]ace was, as the District Court found, 
the predominant, overriding factor explaining the General Assembly’s decision to attach 
to the Eleventh District various appendages containing dense majority-black 
populations.” 280 Compliance with an order under the VRA, said the Court, was not valid 
unless it survived strict scrutiny. In Miller, the Court held that the districts at issue were 
created with an exclusively racial motive, and were therefore unconstitutional. The 
application of strict scrutiny to state action taken under the VRA served to nullify civil 
rights legislation designed to provide protection to minority voters. 
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The Court reiterated the strong distinctions between Sections 2 and 5 in Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board (1997).281 There the Court held that a preclearance denial 
could not be based on a Section 2 violation. Retrogression must be present to justify a 
preclearance denial; further, since retrogression and vote dilution were not the same, the 
DOJ could not attempt to mitigate vote dilution as part of a preclearance petition. 282 The 
Court rejected the DOJs combining Section 2 into Section 5 consideration, as had become 
the norm in the DOJ Section 5 preclearance process.283  The Court went on to further 
limit VRA application in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board II (1999).284 There, the 
Court held that Section 5 preclearance may not be denied to a school board plan adopted 
with discriminatory but non-retrogressive intent.  The Court thereby instructed the DOJ 
that all apportionment plans were worthy of preclearance (approval) unless they were 
retrogressive in purpose or effect.285  If a redistricting plan maintained the status quo or 
only modestly improved voting power, then it qualified as constitutional. “Under this new 
standard, the Department [could not] object to an ameliorative plan even in the face of 
‘smoking gun’ evidence of racial animus on the part of the key decision-makers."286  
In Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003), “[t]he Supreme Court narrowed the scope of 
sanctionable changes to election laws and procedures that could be found to be 
retrogressive, dramatically altering the established legal test for evaluating whether 
certain election laws had a harmful effect on minority voters.287 Here, a Georgia plan 
replaced majority minority districts with “influence districts,” districts where minority 
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voters cannot elect “a member of their group, but do have the opportunity to help choose 
the winner from among the white or Anglo (and sometimes other candidates) contesting 
that election.”288 The Court approved of influence districts as non-retrogressive. At the 
same time that the Court denied coverage for racial gerrymandering pursuant to the VRA, 
it approved political gerrymandering completed by parties based purely on political 
motives. But party competition, of course, is strongly tied to race. In a 2004 written 
ruling by Antonin Scalia, Vieth v. Jubelier, the Court ruled that the political 
gerrymandering alleged in the Pennsylvania case was not unconstitutional. Republicans 
newly in control of the state legislature redrew lines to assist the party politically and to 
punish Democrats who had politically gerrymandered the previous districting plan.289  
VRA cases decided by the Rehnquist Court mark a pronounced shift toward the 
application of colorblind principles to VRA jurisprudence. During Rehnquist’s tenure, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to state action designed to comply with VRA orders. It 
voided remedial plans, narrowed the scope of the Act, and established a strong distinction 
between relief under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. The Court shifted away from the 
presumption that the VRA was designed to repair the poor state of minority voting and 
toward the theory, a colorblind one, that no voter should be impacted negatively due to 
the consideration of race in the voting process.    
The Roberts Court. Colorblind conservatism has had a far greater foothold on the 
Court’s decision making in the 2000s than in previous years. The liberal consensus has 
faded and colorblind conservative arguments against affirmative action are now 
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respected. Never dismissed as camouflaged Jim Crow arguments, colorblind conservative 
assertions are considered a logical basis for a fair rendering of the Constitution. Chief 
Justice John Roberts and the other key conservative members of the current Supreme 
Court, Thomas, Scalia and Alito, subscribe to colorblind principles and apply colorblind 
logic on affirmative action legislation and programming. The conservative majority 
believes that affirmative action legislation is outdated and unconstitutional, including the 
important aspects of the VRA.  
The balance between liberals and conservatives on the Roberts Court is the same 
as that on the Rehnquist Court, despite changes in personnel. George W. Bush replaced 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Samuel Alito and Chief Justice Rehnquist with John 
Roberts, after the retirement and death of the former Associate Justice and Chief, 
respectively. The new conservatives joined the core of conservative justices already on 
the Court: Scalia and Thomas, and the conservative leaning moderates, Stevens and 
Kennedy (now the new swing vote after the departure of O’Connor). Barack Obama had 
the opportunity to maintain the preexisting number of justices on the liberal side, by 
appointing Sonia Sotomayor (2009) to replace Justice David Souter, and Elena Kagen 
(2010) to replace Justice John Paul Stevens. Sotomayor and Kagen joined Ginsburg and 
Breyer, preserving the five-to-four balance, conservative to liberal, on the Court in 
existence prior to the change in Court leadership. 
The Roberts Court is a conservative one, and it is conservative on the VRA.  
Roberts came to the Court from a career steeped in conservative policy and 
jurisprudence. A member of the Federalist Society, Roberts clerked for conservative 
judges, including Justice Rehnquist in the 1980s, and served the Reagan and Bush 
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administrations in various capacities.290 Roberts also served as a conservative member of 
the D.C. circuit court. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito also subscribe to colorblind 
conservative principles, prioritize states’ rights, and bring those considerations to bear on 
affirmative action legislation, including the VRA. Thomas has taken the lead in 
publishing opinions that claim that Section 5 is unconstitutional.  
The Court’s affirmative action agenda became clear early in Roberts’ tenure. In 
the Parents v. Seattle case in 2006, an equal protection lawsuit, Roberts wrote for the 
Court to express his dedication to ending race-based remedies. The Court struck down the 
school districts’ rule mandating the consideration of a student’s race as a tiebreaker to 
determine student assignment to local schools due to overcrowding. Roberts relied on the 
precedent in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which he described as a mandate to 
exclude race as a consideration in determining school admissions. Roberts asserted that 
Brown pronounced the end to the consideration of race in grade school assignments and 
that therefore that the Seattle school district acted unconstitutionally. Applying the 
precedent in Adarand Constructors (1994), the Court used strict scrutiny to evaluate the 
states’ use of race as a prerequisite to school assignment and found it unlawful.291 The 
state, said Roberts, had not engaged in the “narrowly tailored,” good faith consideration 
of race neutral alternatives required under the 14th Amendment.292 “The way to end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 The Federalist Society is a “a group of conservatives and libertarians interested in the legal order 
founded on the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental 
powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to 
say what the law is, not what it should be.” See http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/. Samuel Alito, Antonin 
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas are also members of the Federalist Society. 
291  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the Court held that all racial 
classifications must pass strict scrutiny review. Furthermore, past injury does not prima facie show present 
or future injury. After Adarand, even racial classifications designed to remedy past discrimination are 
subject to the high bar posed by strict scrutiny review.  
292 In fact, the school district considered a number of non-racial factors before assigning a student to a 
school. The consideration of race was a tiebreaker measure designed to ensure that the racial composition 
117	  
	  
discrimination based on race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”293 Roberts 
opined. “…[R]ace discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional.”294  
The Roberts Court has applied a similar logic to the Voting Rights Act. It has 
made significant progress at applying colorblind analysis to narrow VRA protection. In 
general, the Court has interpreted the law in a manner than does not favor minority voting 
rights. The Court’s decision in Parents ended state mandated diversity when there was 
overcrowding in the Seattle School district. Similarly, the Court’s interpretation of the 
VRA has been detrimental to the ability of the federal government to apply legislation to 
improve the voting power of minority voters. The Court has taken a hands-off approach 
to federal oversight of state action on voting law changes, even when those changes 
might weaken minority voting rights. This conservative approach has culminated in 
severe restrictions on the VRA’s reach. When the Robert’s Court struck the Section 4 
coverage formula in Shelby v. Holder in 2013, it removed all states from Section 5 
coverage and ended federal oversight of voting law changes under the VRA.295 
 The Roberts Court’s interpretation of the VRA resulted in less protection for 
minority voters and ironically (or perhaps intentionally) greater protection for the 
Republican Party under the VRA. In a 2008 decision, United Latin American Citizens v. 
Perry (2008), the Court approved the “Delay” redistricting plan, despite its highly 
unusual timing –– and the fact that it decreased the voting power of Democratic Latinos. 
The Court held that the political gerrymandering by Republicans, then in control of the 
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293 Parents v. Seattle, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007). 
294 Toobin, Jeffrey. The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court, (New York, NY: Anchor 
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state legislature, was constitutional, despite the unorthodox timing and partisan redrawing 
of district lines just a few years after the decennial redistricting. The Court held that it 
was constitutional for Texas Republicans to redraw district lines to benefit the Party, even 
if it violated Section 2 of the VRA. The Court found a violation of Section 2 in a portion 
of the disputed Texas’ districting plan where it decreased the percentage of Democratic 
Latino voting strength in the district in question. In that district, the Democratic 
representative was replaced by a Republican.  
Voters seeking a majority minority district were rejected by the Court in Bartlett 
v. Strickland (2009). Based on a totality of the circumstances test, the Court held that 
district voters did not meet the threshold test in Thornburg v. Gingles, so that they might 
qualify to be considered for a majority minority district. According to the Court, the 
district was already a “de facto” majority minority district, since blacks could secure 
enough crossover votes to secure the election of their preferred candidate. The Court 
refused to take action to ensure the improvement of minority voting power. On the 
contrary, the Court reiterated its belief that Section 2 did not “require state officials to 
draw election district lines to allow a racial minority that would make up less than 50 
percent of the voting age population in the redrawn district to join with crossover voters 
to elect the minority’s candidate of choice.”296 In general, the Roberts Court has 
deemphasized relief for minority voters pursuant to the VRA. 
In 2009, the Court announced its position that Section 5 of the VRA might not be 
constitutional, the first time a Supreme Court majority openly questioned the validity of 
the statute since it was passed. Filed in federal court six days after the conclusion of the 
2006 reauthorization, but not argued until April 2009, the Northwest Austin Municipal 
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Utility District No. One v. Holder (2009) (MUD) lawsuit was based on the presumption 
that the failure of Congress to amend Section 5 meant that there was a persuasive case to 
be made that the section was outdated and unconstitutional.   
The MUD lawsuit was an action brought by a Texas utility district subject to 
Section 5 coverage because it was located in a covered state. Northwest Austin Municipal 
District challenged the constitutionality of Section 5, and in the alternative, asked the 
Court to rule that Northwest Austin Municipal District be allowed to bail out of Section 5 
coverage independent of the state. The majority of the Court stopped short of holding that 
Section 5 was unconstitutional. But the Court did allow the district to bail out, 
independent of the state, essentially overturning the Court’s decision in City of Rome v. 
United States (1980). The Court went on to explain that subdivisions like the utility 
district were eligible for bailout and that Section 5 was likely unconstitutional. The Court 
made clear that for Section 5 to achieve constitutional security, it would be necessary for 
Congress to revise Section 5 to reflect the significant improvement in voting rights in the 
covered states. The Court took the opportunity both to reveal its lack of respect for the 
VRA and state its intention to strike the most important provision in the law.  
The Court was likely well aware that the possibility of a congressional 
compromise to amend Section 5 was impossible. The 2006 reauthorization had just been 
completed a short three years prior, and the Act, including Section 5, was renewed for 
twenty-five years. It was no secret that Congress intentionally did not amend Section 5 in 
2006 because such an attempt would have made it impossible to pass the reauthorization. 
(See Chapter 3). The MUD decision was eight to one, including all but Justice Thomas in 
the majority. The liberal justices on the Court appear to have agreed to the decision in 
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MUD because it staved off consideration of the constitutionality of Section 5, and 
because it left the legislation intact and unchanged.297 It is also possible that they 
overestimated the sanctity of the legislation’s status as a crown jewel of the Civil Rights 
Movement, and like many, thought it unlikely that the Court would overturn the 
legislation. Clarence Thomas dissented in MUD to insist that the Court should have 
addressed the constitutionality of Section 5. He argued that that section was 
unconstitutional because it exceeded the powers of the 15th Amendment.    
Thomas, a leader on the Court in publishing decisions that aver that Section 5 is 
unconstitutional, dissented again in Perry v. Perez (2012), to assert that Section 5 was 
unconstitutional. In that case, the Supreme Court vacated a proposed redistricting plan in 
Texas, but not to the benefit of minority voters because the original inclusive state district 
lines could not be re-imposed.298 Texas district lines still needed to be redrawn after the 
Court’s rejection of the districting plan, by legislators apparently committed to plans that 
minimized the power of minority voters. As such, the imposition of the preclearance 
requirement left voters insecure as to how their voting rights would be treated by the state 
of Texas. The Court ordered a plan that had “neither had the purpose nor [a potential] 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” but the state 
population had grown and the state legislature remained in control of revising district 
lines.299 Justice Thomas dissented to say that Section 5 was unconstitutional and that the 
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“duly enacted redistricting plans should apply…” free of any preclearance 
requirements.300 
In Shelby v. Holder (2013), the Roberts Court got another opportunity to 
adjudicate the constitutionality of Section 5, and the Court went still further in its 
application of colorblind conservative principles.301 The Court fundamentally restricted 
the power of the Act’s temporary provisions in Shelby. Surprisingly, the Shelby Court 
refrained from holding that Section 5 was unconstitutional. But, the decision was 
nonetheless successful at removing the Section 5 preclearance power. The Court struck 
Section 4 of the VRA in Shelby. Section 4 outlined the formula by which states covered 
by Section 5 were identified. By voiding the Section 4 coverage formula, the Court 
removed all states from coverage, and therefore removed the federal government’s power 
to preclear laws in those states under the VRA. The Court took this action in the face of a 
polarized Congress that even now remains unwilling and unable to revise the coverage 
formula. In Shelby, the Court removed the most powerful operating aspect of the VRA in 
preventing race discrimination in voting.  
In the decision, Roberts wrote that states had significantly improved their voting 
records and that the Section 4 criteria no longer accurately identified states exercising 
discriminatory behavior in the voting arena. Furthermore, Roberts held that the VRA, by 
applying Section 5 to some states and not others, violated the tradition of “equal 
sovereignty of the states,” singling out some states for federal oversight and not others. 302  
Notably, Shelby v. Holder is the first decision since Dred Scott to invoke the doctrine of 
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equal sovereignty where the right to vote is involved.”303 By holding Section 4 
unconstitutional, the Court was able to achieve its aim of disengaging the VRA without 
striking Section 5. With no states covered, the Section 5 power was rendered moot. The 
decision was a boon for the Chief Justice’s anti-affirmative action agenda. Richard 
Hasen, calls “[t][he Chief Justice … a patient man playing a long game” [to end 
affirmative action].304 The Shelby v. Holder decision removed the federal government’s 
power over state voting laws and is the biggest conservative victory over the VRA Order 
to date. 
Thomas, joined by Scalia, concurred with the majority that Section 4 was not 
constitutional and reiterated his opinion that he “would [also] find Section 5 of the VRA 
unconstitutional…” 305 According to Thomas, the plain discrimination that Section 5 was 
designed to circumvent no longer existed. It was therefore impossible to justify burdening 
covered states with responsibilities under and federal oversight pursuant to Section 5. 
“The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold Section 5 
as enforcing the 15th Amendment no longer exists.”306 Thomas asserted that even though 
the Court was willing to leave Section 5 intact, Congress failed its burden to justify a 
current need for the provision and its expansion in 2006. 307 Thomas thought the Court 
should have ruled on the constitutionality of Section 5. He argued that “[b]y leaving the 
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inevitable conclusion unstated, the Court needlessly prolong[ed] the [inevitable] demise 
of that provision.”308  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in Shelby, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagen. According to Ginsburg, Congress has the power to enforce the 14th and 15th 
Amendments by reauthorizing the VRA. Further, she held that Congress did so, correctly, 
in 2006, supported by a relevant and ample record. Ginsburg argued that the evidence 
presented at the 2006 reauthorization justified the reauthorization of the VRA and the 
constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5. She pointed out that the Court’s majority decision 
disabled the federal government’s power under Section 5 at a time when it is uniquely 
positioned to counter the impact of “second generation” voter discrimination, which is 
still ongoing in covered states including in Alabama.309 Ginsburg argued that the law 
worked to prevent voter discrimination and that it protected against backsliding by states 
interested in limiting voting rights based on race.  Ginsburg concluded that Section 5 
coverage should be maintained as part of the continuing effort to maintain a voting 
system free of racial discrimination.310 Furthermore, Ginsburg considered the Court’s 
reliance on “equal sovereignty” to be improperly applied.311 Ginsburg lamented that 
“[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop 
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you 
are not getting wet.”312  
Evidence of the damage of the Shelby decision to the power of the VRA was 
almost instantaneously apparent. States previously barred from implementing potentially 
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discriminatory voter ID laws by the DOJ under Section 5 immediately announced their 
intention to put those laws into action.313 Texas and North Carolina both instituted laws 
previously denied preclearance shortly after the Shelby decision was published. 
Additional states were thus motivated to reinstate efforts to pass or enact voter ID laws 
and/or to impose laws frozen during the 2012 election. Without the Section 4 criteria to 
identify covered states, the DOJ is unable to bring Section 5 preclearance to bear on 
pending law changes in formerly covered states. The unique power provided by the VRA 
became inoperable. 
Conclusion. The Roberts Court has driven the VRA to the precipice Richard 
Valelly theorized was impossible. The Court rendered the unique power of the VRA void 
and further challenged the hegemony of the VRA Order. The Court’s shift to holding 
parts of the VRA unconstitutional developed out of slow incremental change. Initially the 
Court indicated full support of the spirit and intent of the VRA. But as early as the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the Court shifted to partial support, and by the early 2000s, the 
Court had graduated to tacit non-support of the law’s purpose and objective. The shift 
tracks the development of colorblind conservatism in the social and political spheres. 
Today, some support the liberal consensus and many others endorse colorblind 
conservative principles and consider the VRA to be detrimental to mainstream voters. 
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Conclusion:  The End Game 
 
The right to vote is fundamental to American democracy. When the franchise 
operates effectively, i.e., when people turn out and voice their opinion on issues or in the 
selection of elected officials and their votes are counted, voting is a method by which 
democratic action can take place. After a long history during which the country denied 
most blacks the right to vote and blocked their participation in the creation of policy or 
the election of public officials, the 1965 Voting Rights Act dramatically broadened the 
franchise in the United States to include minority voters. The passage of the VRA 
facilitated and supported the right to vote for blacks by empowering the federal 
government to require states to register voters, oversee state elections, and, in some cases, 
preclear state voting law changes before they could be put into effect.  Under the effects 
of the law, a new racial voting order took root, dislodging the Jim Crow Order that had 
been in place since the end of Reconstruction 
This dissertation has evaluated the influence of conservatism, mostly driven by 
Republican political imperatives, on federal efforts to enforce the Voting Rights Act. The 
VRA engendered resistance by those who resented the establishment of federal power 
over state functions left to the states under the Constitution and by virtue of long-
established practice. Conservatives resisted the passage of the legislation during 
deliberations in 1965 and have continued to oppose the Act throughout the almost fifty 
years that it has been the law. Over time, the conservative long game against the VRA 




Because the VRA has had such a significant impact on voting in the United 
States, it came to be taken for granted as a new political order. By 1969, the VRA 
enabled more than eight hundred thousand blacks to register to vote in the seven states to 
which Section 5 originally applied.314 The number of black elected officials also 
increased dramatically, “more than fivefold, rising from 1469 in 1970 to 7370 in 
1990.”315 These developments in the electorate, combined with the ongoing application 
and reauthorization of the VRA’s temporary provisions in 1970,1975,1982, and 2006, led 
many to believe that the remedy was permanent and not subject to erosion. 
Yet in fact the law has suffered from the influence of conservatism on the federal 
government, and that has led to recent deterioration in the VRA Order. Contrary to 
Richard Valelly’s optimistic conclusion in The Two Reconstructions, the research 
presented here shows that the VRA, often called the “crown jewel of the civil rights 
movement,”316 did not secure enduring legitimacy in American jurisprudence.317 Quite 
the contrary: the legislation is at risk of becoming impotent. As described in detail in 
Chapter 5, a major section of the law, Section 4, was voided in 2013.318 That change 
resulted in a significant weakening of the VRA by undermining Section 5, which had 
granted the federal government authority to preclear voting law changes in any of the 
states identified under Section 4. The decision matters because Section 4 identified states 
in which voting laws still required oversight.  
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 This is not the first time in American history that anti-discrimination law designed 
to establish minority access to the franchise has become vulnerable. Lacking persistent 
support from the national government, the sweeping anti-discrimination provisions 
established after the Civil War to provide newly freed blacks the right to vote and to 
neutralize the power of states to deny the franchise eroded and collapsed quickly.319 
Initially these provisions were supported in Congress, where Radical Republicans passed 
the laws in large part to bolster the Republican Party in the South. But anti-discrimination 
laws were not backed by the executive branch, which prioritized the restoration of the 
Union. Nor were they supported by the Supreme Court, whose decisions undercut, 
voided, and ultimately rendered obsolete anti-discrimination law.320 By the turn of the 
20th century, the Jim Crow Voting Order was in force; states controlled the franchise, and 
blacks were denied the right to vote. 
 
Reconsidering Voting Rights Act Scholarship   
Implications for Political Science Literature. My research contributes to political 
science literature, specifically to the study of American politics, public policy, and 
American political development.  Most directly, this dissertation extends the scholarship 
of American political development and applies as its framework the principle of 
“intercurrence,” a concept introduced by Karen Orren and Stephen Skowrownek.  The 
development and enforcement of the VRA have been affected by “the awkward 
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overlapping of old and new orders, which produces friction and change.”321 Here, I show 
that intercurrence between the Voting Rights Act Order and the Colorblind Voting Order 
that vie for hegemony today have influenced the durability of the VRA Order. Political 
scientists and historians writing before me have largely overlooked this interaction when 
examining the VRA. Most literature written about the Act has assumed that the law is 
permanent and that outside forces are not actively eroding it.  (To be fair, this decay has 
become much clearer over time.) My examination of the influence of conservatism on the 
national government’s implementation of the VRA highlights the dynamics of 
intercurrence and reveals cracks in the VRA foundation that formerly went unrecognized.  
 My work also explores the relationships of the political parties to each other and 
to voting rights after the height of the civil rights movement. These connections were 
examined for the First Reconstruction period by V.O. Key and Paul Frymer. They 
demonstrate that the failure of either party to support black voting rights post-
Reconstruction contributed to the development and maintenance of the Jim Crow Voting 
Order. In this dissertation I show that voting rights legislation in the modern era is better 
supported by the Democratic Party. Opposition to VRA-based minority voting rights is 
located primarily in the Republican Party. My dissertation exposes how Republican 
officials in all branches of government have argued against and taken action to limit the 
influence of the VRA.  
Engaging historians on the VRA. My research also provides a historical analysis 
of the VRA. Historians have completed significant work that has analyzed the similarities 
between the First and the Second Reconstructions. Much of the insight of that writing 
relies on a framework that assumes that the Second Reconstruction succeeded whereas 
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the First did not. Historians such as C. Vann Woodward and Eric Foner have compared 
the Reconstructions to determine the causes for the decline of the First Reconstruction 
and the rise of Jim Crow laws. Foner ultimately posits a number of factors for the decline 
of anti-discrimination law post-Reconstruction; Woodward offers insight into the 
development of Jim Crow laws. As discussed in Chapter One, Woodward’s work also 
established that the two periods were very similar, and he cautioned that the VRA Order 
could become subject to the same kind of deterioration that occurred in the late 1800s. He 
warned, in his 1981 Congressional testimony at reauthorization of the VRA, that a 
weakening of Section 5 might portend a revival of voter discrimination. In the aftermath 
of the Shelby v. Holder Supreme Court decision, Woodward’s warning appears to have 
become fact.  
My research extends the work of these historians on the VRA by exploring the 
near fifty-year life of the Act. From this perspective, it is possible to see that, despite the 
significant strength of the VRA Order and its successes, the Act is not unassailable. 
Besides confirming Woodward’s warning, my analysis affirms Alexander Keyssar’s 
thesis that voting rights in the U.S. are cyclical, that they expand and contract over time.  
Voting rights expanded in 1965 at the passage of the VRA; there has been a consistent 
and ongoing effort to contract those rights since.  
Valelly’s The Two Reconstructions. In my dissertation, I take issue with Richard 
Valelly’s claim in his book, The Two Reconstructions, that the Second Reconstruction is 
a success in contrast to the First. Valelly focuses his work on explaining the relationship 
of party and jurisprudence building during the First and Second Reconstructions. He 
argues that the impacts of both party politics and judicial decisions during the second 
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reformation of discrimination law produced a voting order that is more or less permanent. 
Hence, in his view, the VRA became a durable piece of legislation that has done much to 
remedy inequality over the course of approximately forty years (he was writing in 2004), 
in contrast to legislation passed during the First Reconstruction, which was repealed 
within ten years. Valelly centers his comparison on political party strength and 
jurisprudence building, and the strategy is persuasive.  His assessment assumes, however, 
that the fortuitous state of the Democrats’ party building and jurisprudential support that 
existed in the 1960s and 1970s meant that the legislation has not been significantly 
threatened by time or other pressures. I argue that the conservative movement has 
undermined the law and that it has produced an effect that is akin to the activity that 
caused the end of similar legislation during the First Reconstruction. This time, the 
pressure was more subtle and took longer to have a negative impact.  
In fact, in The Two Reconstructions, Valelly correctly points out a number of 
problems facing the VRA. I would argue that all of the challenges Valelly identifies are 
intertwined with conservative opposition, which is investigated here. However, Valelly 
does not consider the challenges fatal to the VRA Voting Order. Rather, he concludes 
that reauthorization of the Act in 2006 would be critical because the Second 
Reconstruction aims had not yet been achieved and because there was still a need for the 
remedy to continue to work as a “gradual solvent of economic and educational 
inequality.”322 Valelly ends his investigation confident that the legislation would be 
renewed, and that it would continue to exist until the aims of the VRA Order had been 
accomplished.  
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Valelly cites three main issues faced by the VRA—he calls them “warts”— 
undermining the bipartisan political and judicial support that has heretofore upheld the 
VRA and its unique provisions.323 First, he notes that since the passage of the VRA, the 
Republican Party has used it to mobilize the existing membership and to solicit new 
members in actual opposition to the Act and other remedies for black and other minority 
communities. Second, he argues that the GOP has abused the application of the law by 
using it to benefit white voters; and third, that the Supreme Court has become more 
conservative and narrowed the application of the Act. In response to the first two issues, 
Valelly explains that the VRA was indeed something of a “golden goose” for Republican 
Party mobilization. And he acknowledges that the GOP abused the VRA by the use of 
Section 2 to redistrict to benefit white voters. But he does not view these problems as 
potentially fatal to the VRA Order.  
Valelly’s third “wart” is related to jurisprudence. He argues that the Court had 
become more conservative and has narrowed the application of both Sections 2 and 5. 
Still, he is not “convinced that the Court’s application of colorblind conservatism has 
harmed black voters,” and he downplays Supreme Court opposition to the VRA as 
“relatively recent.”324 Valelly cites the twenty-five years of support for the Act following 
its passage, and the fact that the Court’s support was critical to the establishment of a 
solid voting rights order that fundamentally changed the game for black voters, 
essentially to assert that trouble from the Supreme Court is unlikely.   
 Valelly’s assumptions are reasonable. In 2004, when Valelly published his work, 
there had been no significant constitutional challenges to Section 5 at the Supreme Court 
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and the Congress had by then repeatedly reauthorized the legislation. Not only that, but, 
as he notes, when the Court had made changes to the Act that limited its application, 
Congress amended the VRA to overrule the Court. A direct challenge to Section 5 of the 
Act was not initiated until 2006, after Congress reauthorized the VRA for twenty-five 
years. Before the North Austin Municipal District v. Holder ruling in 2008, the Voting 
Rights Act Order did appear safe from desecration by the Supreme Court. From Valelly’s 
perspective, as well as that of a majority of academics and politicos, a Court challenge of 
the VRA would not be fatal. Clearly, the defiance presented by Republican presidential 
enforcement (including the nomination of conservative justices) went unrecognized as a 
major threat to the VRA Order.   
 The problems are more serious than Valelly acknowledges. The passage of the 
VRA did provide the Republican Party with a strong issue on which to encourage 
membership based on race division. Since the 1970s, the Party has grown to include large 
numbers of whites, in and outside the South, with strong gains among married voters, 
men, and Catholics.325 These have added strength to Republican voting rolls, and that 
strength has increased Republican control of state legislatures and governors’ mansions. 
As a result, arguments generated by conservatives in Congress echo in state and local 
legislatures and have benefited the conservative long game against the legislation at the 
national and state levels.  
 In addition, Republican legislatures have used the VRA to draw district lines that 
benefit Republicans. The drawing of those lines in the 1990s led to a shift in the 
composition of state legislatures and subsequent moves to pass voter identification 
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legislation, beginning in the 2000s.  In addition to using the legislation to maximize 
Republican voting strength, the VRA has also been used by white plaintiffs in voting 
discrimination lawsuits. The Supreme Court has tolerated these suits, which have resulted 
in relief for white voters and the denial of relief for voters of color under the law 
specifically designed to protect minority voters after a long history of voter 
discrimination.  
 The “relatively recent” challenges Valelly points to at the Supreme Court are 
revealed in this dissertation to have, in reality, been “a-long-time-a-coming.” Although 
the Warren Court exercised clear support for the VRA, after 1970, the Court began to 
limit ever more consistently the application of the law, steadily strengthening the now 
fifty-year trend of diluting support for the Act and, inevitably, the Act itself. Valelly 
addresses concerns about the Court by relying on past support and experience. But, 
unlike past situations, there is no upcoming reauthorization where Congress might amend 
the Act to reverse Court decisions. Even if there were, Congress is far too polarized today 
to overrule Shelby on the floor. Congress made no changes to the VRA after the MUD 
decision, and it is highly unlikely to agree to reinstate Section 4. My dissertation shows 
that the problems Valelly addresses cursorily in his conclusion are far more important 
than they appear to him.  
 
Review of the Dissertation Findings: Opposition to the VRA  
Opposition to the VRA has centered on Section 5 of the Act. The Section 5 
authorization of federal oversight over state voting law changes struck at the core of 
federalism relations under the Jim Crow voting order and has continued to offend states 
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rights’ proponents since. Section 2 of the Act has also been contested, but it provides 
traditional relief, viz., litigation, and so is less a motivator of the intense pushback against 
the VRA than is Section 5. Section 5 was specifically designed to improve upon litigation 
as a form of relief, and its intrusion into state sovereignty recalls the passions of the 
nullification debates over the Alien and Sedition Act or the nation’s late 1850s conflicts 
over slavery. Regardless of the section of the VRA being challenged, when people think 
VRA, they think Section 5.   
Resistance in Congress. Congress passed the VRA in 1965 with strong bipartisan 
majorities, and it renewed the Act at every opportunity, in 1970 1975, 1982, and 2006. 
But the strong roll call records enjoyed by the VRA at reauthorization masked significant 
and ongoing dissent in Congress since 1965. Conservative opposition has been expressed 
in the form of arguments against the Act, attempts to neutralize the Act’s provisions, and 
the exercise of delay and sabotage tactics during reauthorization hearings. Conservative 
dissent has existed as an important part of each reauthorization of the VRA.   
Conservative dissent in Congress has been sustained but has resulted in few clear 
victories at limiting or repealing the law. Once, in 1970, representatives in the House 
were able to remove Section 5 from the legislation when the Mitchell bill passed, but the 
victory was short lived. The measure was replaced by a compromise bill generated in the 
Senate that included Section 5. On the other hand, Congressional contestation has helped 
to strengthen and engender public opposition to the VRA and to make it vulnerable to 
political and legal challenge outside Congress.   
Early conservative argumentation against the VRA in Congress was relatively 
unpersuasive. Articulated in what was considered the outdated language of the traditional 
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Jim Crow Order, early opposition arguments did not resonate effectively with the liberal 
consensus of the 1970s, or with the cultural expectation that civil rights legislation would 
be enforced to democratize voting for many who had experienced discrimination. And, 
despite the vast improvements in voting fairness, by 1975 parity between white and black 
voters had not yet been achieved. Moreover, ongoing resistance to the VRA by states was 
well documented. In 1970 and 1975, proponents were able to show that the Act and its 
unique provisions should continue. Both reauthorizations resulted in legislation that was 
stronger than the original bill. In 1975, the legislation was expanded to include bilingual 
minorities. In both years, Section 5 remained intact. Conservative resistance, though 
present, was not successful in reversing the law or mitigating Section 5. It seems 
reasonable to characterize this opposition as the “last gasp” of Jim Grow, originating in 
the old Democratic Party but gradually becoming untethered from its partisan roots. 
As I have observed, the locus and content of conservative opposition shifted 
during the 1980s and after. The GOP’s Southern strategy, aimed at building a durable 
majority through a commanding margin among the white electorate, paid dividends over 
time. Conservative argumentation became not just more acceptable to the mainstream 
media, but also to a growing number of academics, and it became persuasive to large 
segments of an increasingly conservative white population by the 1980s. But it was still 
largely unsuccessful at the 1982 reauthorization. In the House, Henry Hyde, who led 
conservative resistance to the VRA, was won over by the presentation sponsored by VRA 
supporters. Hyde retreated from his anti-Section 5 proposals over the course of the 
hearings. In the Senate, Orrin Hatch’s campaign against the amendment of Section 2 of 
the VRA also failed. Hatch made some inroads by associating VRA relief with 
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“proportional representation” and “quotas,” concepts particularly objectionable to 
conservatives, but his campaign did not end the effort to amend Section 2 to ensure 
plaintiffs the latitude to bring lawsuits based on discriminatory effect. Senate opposition 
was successful at delaying the momentum of the reauthorization proceedings, and it did 
motivate an amendment that made it possible for some jurisdictions to bail out of Section 
5 coverage independent of the covered state in which they were located. But in general, 
conservative arguments failed and opponents suffered from a lack of support from the 
executive branch, which they needed to counter the well organized and strong external 
support attained by the pro-VRA lobby.  
Conservative dissent in Congress had the most impact in 2006, because 
Republican right-wing representatives failed, yet again, to repeal or amend Section 5. 
That year, there was a bipartisan agreement to pass the law without change. Post 
agreement, a faction of dissenters in the House argued vehemently on the floor against 
Section 5 and the bilingual ballot provisions of the Act, and waged what appeared at the 
time to be a near-fatal delay of the proceedings by causing an indefinite impasse in the 
deliberations. The impasse was broken, however, and the Act passed in the Senate, and 
the reauthorization was signed. As part of an effort to discredit the legislation, 
conservative senators who voted in favor of reauthorization nonetheless broke with 
tradition and issued a rare Senate Judiciary Committee report, without bipartisan input 
from Democratic senators, in which they decried the deliberations and the legislation. 
While these rebellions did not achieve legislative success, the failure to revise Section 5 
provided the basis and momentum for the North Austin Municipal District challenge, 
which was filed a few days after Bush 43 signed the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, 
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Coretta Scott King and César Chávez Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments into law.326 Thus, Congressional dissent succeeded to some degree in 2006 
by serving up a bill that provided a basis for a Supreme Court challenge. For opponents 
to the VRA, it was an excellent time to send civil rights legislation to the Supreme Court. 
Mixed Enforcement in the Executive Branch. The executive branch has exhibited 
uneven enforcement of the VRA. All of the presidents have enforced the law and all of 
them, including Lyndon Johnson, have been influenced by conservatism in the process. 
Johnson was the most enthusiastic in his support for the VRA. Some presidents who 
opposed the VRA were compelled to enforce it vigorously. Others supported the Act but 
were forced to exercise enforcement conservatively. Johnson administered the VRA and 
secured excellent results though his application of the law, but his administration of the 
law remained cautious. Johnson promoted the law and portrayed it publicly as a positive 
achievement. His administration registered voters and was responsible for a significant 
increase in newly registered black voters, whose numbers skyrocketed. Johnson also 
dispatched examiners and observers to supervise elections in some jurisdictions in the 
South. On the other hand, the numbers of dispatched examiners and observers was low, 
and they were reported to have provided little protection against discriminatory voting 
practices when they occurred at the polls. In addition, Johnson failed to create guidelines 
for Section 5 preclearance or to wield the remedy at all during his incumbency.  
 The moderate Republican presidents, Nixon and Ford, both served during VRA 
reauthorization years and both gave rhetorical support to the VRA even as they worked to 
weaken it. Both presidents, for example, attempted to limit the power of Section 5, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




given the opportunity to do so during the 1970 and 1975 reauthorizations, as part of their 
program to entice white Southern voters to the GOP. Nixon was unable to limit the 
impact of the VRA legislation in 1970. Ford, in contrast, did force a decrease in the 
number of renewal years applied to the temporary provisions in 1975, but he also failed at 
limiting Section 5. On the other hand, both Nixon and Ford enforced the Act vigorously. 
The Nixon and Ford administrations issued the highest number of objections issued in 
Section 5 enforcement between 1965 and 2013, perhaps because a plethora of offending 
laws existed when Section 5 was first applied, and perhaps because the liberal consensus 
successfully demanded enforcement of the Act during its early years.    
The conservative Republican presidents, Reagan and the two Bushes, 
cumulatively pushed VRA enforcement to the right. The Reagan administration waged a 
head-on challenge to civil rights ideology and the legislation and affirmative action 
programs established to promote civil rights. The Reagan administration opposed aspects 
of the VRA in 1982 when the Act was reauthorized, but the administration did not 
provide sufficient support for congressional conservative opposition to make gains. 
George H.W. Bush opposed the VRA and other civil rights laws but did so less 
wholeheartedly than Reagan because he was unwilling to provoke the same kind of 
resistance encountered by Reagan for his anti-discrimination law agenda.  
Yet George W. Bush was successful at mitigating the impact of the VRA, using 
tactics introduced by Reagan. Bush 43 brought colorblind conservatism to bear on anti-
discrimination law, the VRA in particular. While he did not instigate an amendment of 
the VRA or seek legislative limits on Section 5, his Justice Department used its 
enforcement power to counter the aims of the VRA. The Bush 43 DOJ refused to bring or 
139	  
	  
support VRA lawsuits on behalf of black plaintiffs, but it did do so on behalf of white 
voters. The Bush administration fostered an atmosphere of permissiveness for states 
under the legislation by decreasing enforcement and by replacing long-time employees, 
in sections of the federal government responsible for voting rights, with political 
appointees who did not promote the purpose of the Act. Bush 43 also increased the 
number of conservative justices on the Supreme Court and thereby contributed to an 
increase in conservative opinions, including opinions on the VRA. 
Democratic presidents have supported and enforced the VRA. None of them 
served during a reauthorization of the VRA. The Carter and Clinton administrations 
enforced the VRA and attempted to protect minority voters. The Obama administration, 
despite its clear support for the VRA and attempts to enforce it, has been limited in what 
it can do. The Obama DOJ found it difficult to bring preclearance objections due to the 
pending challenges to Section 5 and the potential for lawsuits from states subject to 
objections. Several states threatened to bring Section 5 challenges in retaliation for 
executive enforcement of the VRA. More recently, the administration has found the 
legislation hard to use because Section 5 was rendered moot by the decision in Shelby v. 
Holder, holding that Section 4, which identified covered states, is unconstitutional. 
Without the power to object, the administration has less ability to prevent the enactment 
of discriminatory state voting laws.   
Turnabout at the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has made a 180-degree shift 
in its consideration of the VRA, from support to non-support, over the 1970-2013 period. 
Over the same period, the Supreme Court has become more conservative. George W. 
Bush’s nominees to the Court, in particular, have helped to increase the number of 
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conservative decisions issued. Opinions interpreting the VRA today incorporate 
colorblind conservative principles and deem the purpose of the VRA to be out-of-sync 
with the needs of a “post-racial” society.   
The quarter of a century of support by the Supreme Court cited by Valelly is more 
nuanced than he depicts. It is true that the Warren Court did approve the legislation and 
affirmed the constitutionality of Section 5, including its unique assignment of federal 
oversight of state voting power in covered states.327 The Warren Court went on to 
establish a wide purview for Section 5 application when it held that “all voting law 
changes” were subject to Section 5.328 But that level of support did not survive for 
anywhere near twenty-five years. After 1970, the Burger Court began to set limits on the 
law, limits that became incrementally greater over time. Prior to the Roberts Court, the 
justices respected the VRA and Congress’s power to pass the VRA, but the Court brought 
conservatism to bear early, and continued to apply conservative principles over the life of 
the legislation. In 1982 and 2006, Congress amended the VRA to overturn what it 
considered to be overly conservative Supreme Court rulings made between 
reauthorizations. The Roberts Court has exhibited little respect for the legislation or 
Congress’s power to pass it.  The Court removed the underpinnings of the executive 
branch to exercise the unique power that long defined the VRA.  
The Roberts Court brought colorblind principles directly to bear when evaluating 
recent direct challenges to Section 5, in North Austin Municipal District No. 1 v. Holder 
(2010) and Shelby v. Holder (2013). In MUD, a challenge to Section 5, the Court sent a 
strongly worded message to Congress that Section 5 was probably unconstitutional and 
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that it would not survive a second challenge without amendment. The Court was aware 
that Congress would not be able to come to agreement to amend Section 5 because it was 
common knowledge that the failure to revise Section 5 was what made its reauthorization 
possible in 2006.  
In Shelby v. Holder, the Court struck down an important provision of the VRA. It 
did not hold that Section 5 was unconstitutional, but it did void the equally important 
Section 4, the section that identifies those states covered by Section 5. By removing all 
states identified in Section 4 from coverage, the Court rendered Section 5 inoperable, 
despite the fact that the provision was not ruled unconstitutional. The Court determined 
that the Section 4 criteria for coverage were no longer relevant or necessary. The dissent, 
led by Justice Ginsburg, argued that Section 4 was not outdated but in fact provided 
important protection that helped to maintain fair voting laws and elections. Ginsburg 
dissented to argue that striking Section 4 was a mistake, and analogized the decision to 
getting rid of an umbrella in the middle of a rainstorm.329 
 
Conclusions and Consequences 
Conservative ideology and argumentation have consistently if quietly influenced 
the federal government’s implementation of the VRA. In the case of the Supreme Court 
in particular, support for the law has decreased, and the Court’s decisions have had a 
limiting impact on the VRA. The VRA has the potential to become irrelevant, now that 
the federal government is no longer able to block the implementation of racially 
discriminatory voting laws in covered states.  Additionally, the moral imperative imposed 
by the law has been eroded. It is a testament to the persuasiveness and persistence 
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demonstrated by the conservative long game that the Supreme Court struck Section 5 of 
the VRA. As this dissertation reveals, however, it was not an abrupt shift.  
 In 2006, congressional supporters of the VRA attempted to protect Section 5 from 
the Supreme Court attack. Proponents presented extensive evidence to justify the 
reauthorization of Section 5. Because the measure was remedial in nature, contemporary 
law indicated that Congress had a constitutional power to pass it if the legislation was 
“congruent and proportional” to the problem it sought to address. 330 Thousands of pages 
of evidence were submitted alongside extensive testimony to show that Section 5 was 
still necessary, despite the passage of time since 1965. Members of Congress and 
academics heralded the 2006 evidence as satisfying that standard. As noted, the Court 
nevertheless struck Section 4 and removed all the states subject to Section 5 from its 
jurisdiction. 
The end of the Section 5 preclearance power will result in a number of significant 
consequences. Covered states that have a history of voter discrimination are no longer 
obligated to submit voting law changes to the DOJ, which means that these laws will not 
be reviewed to determine if they discriminate against minority voters. The potential for 
uncovered states to come under Section 5 has vanished. Covered states are now able to 
implement voting laws that the DOJ previously cited as discriminatory. As discussed 
above, C. Vann Woodward warned Congress in 1981 that a weakening of the Section 5 
preclearance provision might “open the door to a rush of measures to abridge, diminish, 
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and dilute if not emasculate the power of the black vote in Southern states.”331 Woodward 
was convinced that if given the opportunity, states would pass racially discriminatory 
voting laws, ones they were prevented from passing while the VRA was in force. Indeed, 
in 2013, the states of North Carolina and Texas both promptly passed voter identification 
laws after the Shelby decision that previously had sparked objections from the Justice 
Department pursuant to Section 5.   
States now have more freedom to enact and implement voter identification and 
similar laws without sanction by the federal government. This increases the potential for 
partisan redistricting (which the Court has approved) to the detriment of minority voters 
and the dilution and suppression of minority votes. Seeking to maximize its advantage 
among white voters, a declining share of the population, the Republican Party has largely 
abandoned any efforts to attract minority voters and opted instead to limit the electoral 
participation of minority, poor, and elderly voters. Republicans will seek to wrest 
presidential control from the Democrats and clearly hope that voter ID legislation will 
help to ensure that Republicans have a leg up in future elections.332  In so-called 
battleground states, minority voters can be the critical margin of difference in an election.  
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Republicans accordingly have pursued strategies to deter minority voters from going to 
the polls, seeking potentially decisive electoral advantages.  
 The VRA was specifically designed to expand the ability of minority voters to 
obtain relief from discriminatory voting practices and laws and to end the marginalization 
of the minority vote. To do this, the VRA provided an additional remedy so that options 
for relief would not be limited to litigation, always a costly, inefficient, and minimally 
effective recourse. The end of Section 5 coverage means that recovery under the VRA is 
limited to Section 2 litigation. The Shelby v. Holder decision therefore returned voting 
rights relief to pre-1965 levels. This is highly unfortunate when today the widespread 
adoption of voter identification and similar laws threatens to return the U.S. to a voting 
order that is similar to the JVO, one where the rights of minorities to vote are not 
guaranteed. Alexander Keyssar has noted the similarities between modern voter ID laws 
and laws passed during the late 1800s in contravention of the 15th Amendment.333  
Today many have analogized voter identification laws to poll taxes (because 
voters need to obtain proper identification that in most states has a cost associated with 
it). In the last ten years, some states have been accused, not of violence and intimidation, 
but of mass misinformation about voting and polling places and procedures, which deters 
minority voters from casting ballots. Recently, it has been claimed that some states have 
not provided adequate voting stations and have administered the polls so that it takes 
many hours to vote,334 which has strained working voters especially in states where 
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absentee ballot provisions have been repealed.  Other states have been alleged to have 
placed inadequate voting equipment in minority neighborhoods and to have failed to 
include all ballots in final tallies.335 These offenses do not rise to the level of the Jim 
Crow Order, with its systematic and wholesale blocking of minority participation.  Still, 
they do allow for race based partisan manipulation of access to the polls. 
It is unlikely that Congress will be able to revive Section 4 of the VRA or 
establish new legislation that would effectively curtail voter discrimination as Congress 
was unable to revise Section 5 in 2006. Instead, the Obama administration has begun to 
investigate the possibility of obligating states to opt in to Section 5 coverage pursuant to 
Section 3 of the VRA. Section 3 allows a court to “bail-in” a jurisdiction to a 
preclearance regime similar to what was required under Section 5 before Shelby.336 Under 
Section 3, jurisdictions are covered for limited time periods for specifically determined 
types of legal changes.   
Congress could conceivably pass some new form of voting rights legislation, but 
this seems unlikely. Not only is Congress under conservative control, but also the Court 
has ruled that Section 4 of the Act is no longer necessary in today’s so-called “post-
racial” environment and barred race-based districting plans. The passage of a new 
remedy would require states to buy into federal oversight after their fifty years of trying 
to shed that obligation. Even if a new law had the support of the executive branch and 
Congress, the Court today has the power to strike the legislation quickly based on current 
precedent. Obviously, new legislation that did not rely on federal oversight might not 
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require the support of the national government, but traditionally minority voters have 
only been able to obtain relief from state-controlled discriminatory voting practices when 
the federal government became involved. Scholars and activists have begun to investigate 
the potential need for a Third Reconstruction. 337 
Importance to Current Events. In addition to its contribution to Political Science 
literature, the analysis provided by this dissertation is also directly relevant to the current 
socio-political environment in America. Voting rights remain an important, controversial, 
and often explosive, issue on the American political scene. Voter identification and 
similar laws are on the rise, and their purpose is to improve the Republican political 
advantage by impeding voting by minority, poor, and elderly voters. Voter discrimination 
will continue to be an important issue in the foreseeable future. Republicans are currently 
in control of both houses of Congress and the state legislatures and governors mansions 
in a significant number of states. Opposition to civil rights legislation, including the 
VRA, has been centered in the Republican Party at the state and national levels. The 
implementation of voter identification laws and redistricting might well challenge the 
power of minority voters and impact the outcome of electoral choices in the upcoming 
presidential and other elections. In the unlikely event that Congress bolsters the power of 
the VRA or grassroots campaigns are waged to create alternative remedies for the future, 
it is important, even essential, to understand what has occurred before and how 
conservatism affected the prior effort. In popular culture and in history books, the VRA is 
portrayed as effective legislation that took a struggle to obtain but which passed and is at 
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work. The development of VRA resistance and its outcomes have not heretofore been 
adequately researched and presented.  
Future Research. There are questions related to the history of the VRA, which 
this dissertation has not answered. Future research should, for example, evaluate the 
number of objections by the Department of Justice from 1965-2013 to assess the degree 
to which conservatism specifically affected the voting rights section of the DOJ in its 
administration of Section 5. Application of the VRA should also be evaluated to 
determine how thorough states have been about their Section 5 submissions over time. 
The number of objections under Section 5 has historically been extremely low. A 
possible reason for this is that federalism has constricted VRA enforcement throughout 
its life, i.e. the Department of Justice has been reserved in its enforcement. I would want 
to choose two states perhaps to evaluate for a research project such as this. It will also be 
important to evaluate the impact of the loss of Section 4. What is the discriminatory 
impact of laws passed in covered states that were in fact, or would potentially have been, 
objected to by the DOJ if Section 5 were applicable? This question would prove 
especially interesting if evaluated in conjunction with electoral returns from the 2016 
presidential election. And, evaluation of the impact of the Shelby decision will do much 
to illuminate the positive influence of the VRA’s unique remedy and/or possibly reveal 
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